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PROLOGUE
Late in the morning of October 18, 1995, a team of federal agents
entered the offices of the law firm of White & Case in Los Angeles car-
rying a federal warrant for the arrest of Giancarlo Parretti, a one-time
Italian waiter who had risen to become the owner of MGM-United Art-
ists, one of the major conglomerates in the American entertainment
industry. Mr. Parretti was at the firm to attend a deposition in one of
many international lawsuits spawned by his highly leveraged purchase
of MGM-United Artists. The warrant authorized his arrest so that he
could be held to answer an anticipated formal request by French
authorities for his extradition to France to face fraud and embezzlement
charges stemming from the MGM-United Artists deal. The agents ar-
rested Parretti without incident, thus beginning the proceedings that
would become known as Parretti v. United States.' No voices were
raised, no guns were drawn. In the world of international extradition
-law, however, the result of the ensuing battle over Mr. Parretti's extradi-
tion would soon become, at least figuratively, a shot heard around the
world, the latest in a decade-long series of cases which threaten to wipe
out a century of U.S. law regulating the arrest and detention of interna-
tional fugitives found in the United States. Those cases are the subject
of this article.
INTRODUCTION
For more than a hundred years, Congress and the federal courts have
fashioned a body of law governing the arrest and detention of
international fugitives found in the United States and the subsequent
1. Parretti v. United States, 112 F.3d 1363, 1367 (9th Cir. 1997), petition for rehearing
with suggestion for rehearing en banc granted, Oct. 2, 1997 (9th Cir. argued Dec. 18, 1997).
The case was argued and submitted on Nov. 21, 1995 and decided on May 6, 1997.
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extradition of those fugitives to the countries where the fugitives face
prosecution for extraditable crimes U.S. law governing the arrest,
2. The process of international extradition is one "whereby one sovereign surrenders to
another sovereign a person sought as an accused criminal or a fugitive offender." M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 5 (2d rev.
ed. 1987); M. WHrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 727-1122 (1962). Extradition
applies to those who are merely charged with an offense but have not been brought
to trial; to those who have been tried and convicted and have subsequently escaped
from custody; and to those who have been convicted in absentia. It does not apply
to a person merely suspected of having committed an offense but against whom no
charge has been laid or to a person whose presence is desired as a witness or for
obtaining or enforcing a civil judgment.
Id. at 227.
International extradition can only be requested or granted pursuant to treaty. BASSIOUNI,
supra, at 56. Today, 104 countries have bilateral extradition treaties with the United States.
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AoREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JAN. 1, 1997 1-315 (1997).
Most cases on the extradition of international fugitives have been fought in the federal
courts rather than in the state courts because the power to extradite has always been vested in
the.executive branch, pursuant to the various extradition treaties entered into by the Secretary
of State, and pursuant to the federal extradition statute. The present statute is codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3184 (1994), and is virtually identical to the original extradition statute enacted in
1848. See Act of Aug. 12, 1848, ch. 167, 9 Stat. 302. Section 1 of the original Act became
Section 5270 of the Revised Statutes in 1876. Section 5270 in turn became 18 U.S.C. § 651
in the 1940 edition of Title 18 of the United States Code, and 18 U.S.C. § 3184 in the 1948
codification. I
As a practical matter, extradition requests by the United States' extradition treaty part-
ners have frequently been made to the Department of State, which has referred them to the
Department of Justice for assignment to the U. S. Attorneys in the federal judicial districts in
which the foreign fugitives have been found, for the commencement of extradition proceed-
ings in the federal courts of those districts. However, state courts as well as federal courts
have been able to exercise jurisdiction over extradition proceedings. Indeed, the present
federal statutory scheme governing extradition provides that
[w]henever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United
States and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States, or
any magistrate authorized to do so by a court of the United States, or any judge of
a court of record of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made
under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having com-
mitted within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes
provided for by such treaty or convention, issue his warrant for the apprehension
of the person so charged.
18 U.S.C. § 3184.
Most arrest warrants in extradition proceedings are termed "provisional" because the
federal extradition statute allows foreign authorities to request the issuance of a warrant of
arrest for a fugitive by U.S. authorities even before the foreign authorities have transmitted to
the U.S. the formal package of documents in which the justification for arrest is detailed in
full. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184. The full package of documents, which is known as the formal
extradition request, typically includes the charging documents and an evidentiary record
comprised of affidavits, translations, ambassadorial certifications, and apostilles required by
the relevant extradition treaty. The justification for allowing courts to issue provisional arrest
warrants without the benefit of first seeing the evidentiary record is the need to arrest fugi-
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detention, and extradition of international fugitives has evolved
alongside the law of arrest and detention in domestic criminal cases, and
yet, many constitutional protections afforded to defendants in domestic
cases have never been extended to international fugitives arrested and
detained in the United States on warrants in aid of extradition requests
Courts have often taken the view that extradition proceedings are not
criminal in nature and are instead creatures of treaties. Extraditions are
also seen to implicate the executive branch's conduct of foreign affairs.
Consequently, the courts have traditionally declined to give international
fugitives important procedural protections which could delay,
complicate, or even thwart the extradition process.4
tives as soon as their whereabouts are discovered, without losing the weeks that it can take to
assemble, translate, and transmit the often voluminous formal extradition documents.
3. Because the federal courts have traditionally taken the view that the extradition
process is not a criminal proceeding in which guilt or innocence are determined, see, e.g.,
Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901), they have often refused to accord fugitives in extradi-
tion cases many of the procedural safeguards that are available to criminal defendants. For
example, courts have held that: the fugitive has no right to discovery or even to cross-
examination of any witnesses who testify at the extradition hearing, Messina v. United
States, 728 F2d 77 (2d Cir. 1984); his or her right to present evidence at the hearing is se-
verely limited, Messina, 728 F2d at 80; the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial
does not apply to an extradition hearing, Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1976);
the Federal Rules of Evidence are inapplicable to extradition proceedings, Melia v. United
States, 667 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981); Merino v. United States Marshal, 326 F.2d 5 (9th Cir.
1963)); the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not apply to extradition hearings, FED.
R. CRIM. P 54(b)(5) states, "[t]hese rules are not applicable to extradition and rendition of
fugitives"; and a fugitive's right to controvert the evidence introduced against him is ex-
tremely limited, Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1978); Caltagirone v. Grant, 629
F.2d 739 (2nd Cir. 1980).
The limited nature of the procedural protections available to fugitives in extradition
cases is described more fully in Part I, infra.
For a helpful discussion of the historical view of extradition law as a creature apart from
criminal law and procedure, see John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition
Law, 76 GEo. L.J. 1441 (1988).
4. In the words of Justice Holmes:
It is common in extradition cases to attempt to bring to bear all the factitious nice-
ties of a criminal trial at common law. But it is a waste of time. For while of course
a man is not to be sent from the country merely upon demand or surmise, yet if
there is presented, even in somewhat untechnical form according to our ideas, such
reasonable ground to suppose him guilty as to make it proper that he should be
tried, good faith to the demanding government requires his surrender.
Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911) (citing Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 184
(1902) and Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387, 485 (1907)).
Although the Supreme Court in one early case referenced extraditions as cases of a
criminal nature, Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371 (1901), a year later the Court stated,
Good faith toward foreign powers, with which we have entered into treaties of ex-
tradition, does not require us to surrender persons charged with crime in violation
of those well-settled principles of criminal procedure which from time immemo-
rial have characterized Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. Persons charged with crime in
[Vol. 19:729
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In the last two decades, however, federal courts have increasingly
questioned the basis for according fewer constitutional protections to
fugitives in international extradition cases than are accorded to defen-
dants in domestic criminal cases. These courts have suggested that some
of the traditional reasons for treating extradition cases differently no
longer hold up to scrutiny. In May of 1997, relying on these earlier de-
cisions, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit broke with a hundred years of tradition-including
some ambiguous but long-established Supreme Court precedent-and
rejected outright many of the justifications for withholding certain con-
stitutional procedural protections from arrestees in extradition cases. In
Parretti v. United States,6 the Ninth Circuit ruled, for the first time by
any court, that the Fourth Amendment prohibition against illegal sei-
zures is violated whenever a court issues a warrant for the provisional
arrest7 of an international fugitive in an extradition matter without a
prior evidentiary showing by the government of probable cause. In this
context, probable cause may be defined as a showing of competent evi-
dence sufficient to enable a person of ordinary prudence and caution to
conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief that a crime has been
foreign countries, who have taken refuge here, are entitled to the same defenses as
others accused of crime within our own jurisdiction. We are not prepared, how-
ever, to yield our assent to the suggestion that treaties of extradition are invasions
of the right of political habitation within our territory, or that every intendment in
proceedings to carry out these treaties shall be in favor of the party accused ....
In the construction and carrying out of such treaties the ordinary technicalities of
criminal proceedings are applicable only to a limited extent. Foreign powers are
not expected to be versed in the niceties of our criminal laws, and proceedings for
a surrender are not such as put in issue the life or liberty of the accused. They
simply demand of him that he shall do what all good citizens are required, and
ought to be willing to do, viz., submit themselves to the laws of their country ...
[W]here the [extradition] proceeding is taken in good faith, a technical noncom-
pliance with some formality of criminal procedure should not be allowed to stand
in the way of a faithful discharge of our obligations.
Grin, 187 U.S. at 184-85.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 480 F Supp. 482 (D. Mass. 1979), rev'd on
other grounds, 611 F.2d 914 (lst Cir. 1979); Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.
1980); In re Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1986); Sahagian v. United States,
864 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1988); Spatola v. United States, 741 F Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
These cases are discussed in Part I, infra.
6. Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1376.
7. In some cases, the formal extradition request is transmitted before or at the same
time that a warrant of arrest is sought. On these occasions, the arrest warrants are not termed
provisional. The warrant in the Parretti case was a provisional warrant, as are the majority of
warrants in extradition cases. Telephone Interview with Frances Fragos Townsend, Director,
Office of International Affairs [hereinafter OIA], Department of Justice, (Aug. 15, 1997).
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committed and that the person whom the government wishes to arrest is
the person who committed it.'
The government's ability to obtain a warrant from a U.S. court for
the provisional arrest of an international fugitive in an extradition case
without being required to make a prior evidentiary showing of probable
cause has been a prominent feature of U.S. extradition law. In domestic
criminal procedure, by contrast' there has been perhaps no more impor-
tant constitutional safeguard than the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause," coupled with
the derivative requirement that the government, when seeking a warrant
of arrest from a judge, make a showing of competent evidence from
which the court can find probable cause to believe that the person whose
arrest is sought committed a crime justifying his arrest.9 Until recently,
no court had ever questioned whether the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment should require the government to make the same eviden-
tiary showing of probable cause in support of a request for a provisional
arrest warrant in an extradition matter as that required under the Fourth
Amendment in a domestic criminal case.'o
8. See Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
9. In full, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. In the twenty years before Parretti, several courts raised the question but managed
to skirt the constitutional question by resting their decisions on other grounds. See Caltagi-
rone, 629 F.2d at 748; Russell, 805 F.2d at 1217; Sahagian, 864 F.2d at 511; United States v.
Williams, 480 F Supp. 482, 485 (D. Mass. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 914 (1st
Cir. 1979); and Spatola, 741 F. Supp. at 366. These cases are discussed in Part I, infra.
Prior to these cases, the last time the issue appears to have been raised was in a series of
cases decided nearly a hundred years ago, including three decisions of the Supreme Court.
While these early cases addressed whether an extradition arrest warrant must be supported
by depositions or other evidence, they did not mention the Fourth Amendment or the prob-
able cause requirement per se. See Rice, 180 U.S. at 371 (1901); Grin, 187 U.S. at 181; and
Yordi v. Nolte, 215 U.S. 227 (1909). While there is language in Rice, Grin and Yordi sug-
gesting that warrants can properly issue, if sworn to by a government official "on
information and belief" i.e., without a predicate evidentiary showing, in fact, a close reading
of these cases suggests the opposite-namely, that a warrant must be supported by deposi-
tions or other evidence supporting a finding of probable cause to believe the fugitive
committed the offense charged in the demanding country. The language in these early cases
is sometimes confusing and even conflicting.
By comparison, a lower court decision of the same era went the other way:
The complaint may, in some instances, be upon information and belief. The exi-
gencies may be such that the criminal may escape punishment unless he is
promptly apprehended ... If the offense be one of the treaty crimes and if it be
[Vol. 19:729
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In yet a second part of the decision the Parretti panel declared un-
constitutional a longstanding presumption at law that a fugitive arrested
on an extradition warrant should be denied bail after arrest." Hencefor-
ward, the court ruled, the government would bear the burden of
establishing that the arrestee posed a risk of flight before a judge would
be able to detain him for the duration of the extradition proceedings. 2
Historically, defendants in domestic criminal cases have benefited from
procedural protections including the Bail Reform Act; 3 the presumption
favoring a defendant's pretrial release on bond; and the requirement that
the government bear the burden of proving that the defendant should be
detained until trial because he is dangerous or poses a "risk of flight."'
4
While the government has usually shouldered this burden in domestic
cases, the burden in extradition cases has traditionally been placed upon
the arrestee, who has consequently had to battle a nearly insurmountable
presumption that the arrestee should remain detained until the extradi-
tion matter is litigated to its conclusion, even if the arrestee can satisfy
the court that the arrestee poses no risk of flight. In the last fifteen
years, several courts and commentators have questioned whether this
presumption might be constitutionally infirm. 6 The Parretti court went
even further and held that the denial of bail for a foreign fugitive in an
extradition proceeding, absent a showing by the government that the
fugitive poses a continuing risk of flight, violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which commands that "No person shall
be ... deprived of ... liberty ... without due process of law."' 7 In so
ruling, the court fundamentally shifted the burden of proof required for
detention in international extradition cases in the Ninth Circuit, from the
arrestee to the government. The Parretti court thus rejected a muddled
stated clearly and explicitly so that the accused knows exactly what the charge is,
the complaint is sufficient to authorize the commissioner to act.
Exparte Sternaman, 77 F 595, 597 (N.D.N.Y 1896).
11. Parretti, 112 F3d at 1384.
12. Id.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(1994).
14. In pertinent part, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: "No per-
son shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime ... nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15. See Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Messina, 566 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Beaulieu v.
Hartigan, 430 F Supp. 915 (D. Mass. 1977), rev'd, 553 F.2d 92 (1st Cir.), vacated, 554 F.2d
1 (lst Cir. 1977). See generally Jeffrey A. Hall, Note, A Recommended Approach to Bail in
International Extradition Cases, 86 MICH. L. REv. 599 (1987). These are discussed in detail
in Part 1.D, infra.
17. Parretti, 112 F3d at 1384 (quoting U.S. CoNsT. amend. V).
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but longstanding body of jurisprudence and created a split with every
other court of appeals that has addressed the issue. 8
The impact of Parretti and other recent cases questioning the con-
stitutionality of provisional arrests and detentions is potentially
sweeping. Together, these decisions reject long-established government
practice and appear to flout nearly a hundred years of jurisprudence on
arrest, bail, and post-arrest detention of international fugitives pending
extradition. Indeed, they appear to conflict with the Supreme Court's
ruling nearly a hundred years ago on the bail issue. 9 The Supreme Court
may now have to address these questions.0
Arguably, the Court may be ready to decide the Fourth Amendment
issue raised in Parretti and its predecessors. In Michigan v. Doran, in
the analogous context of domestic interstate extradition, the Court held
that a U.S. asylum state must give full faith and credit to a requesting
U.S. state's probable cause determination.' In so ruling, the Court in
18. Wright, 190 U.S. at 40. As is shown in Part IV of this article, the Parretti panel at-
tempted to reconcile its holding with the Supreme Court's longstanding pronouncement on
bail in extradition matters. The panel's attempt to portray its holding as ultimately compati-
ble with the Supreme Court's view on bail in extradition cases is not entirely persuasive and
appears to be an attempt to insulate the holding from an inevitable claim that the panel ef-
fectively "overruled" a longstanding decision of the highest court in the land. Should the
Supreme Court wish to adopt the view of the Parretti panel without admitting that it has
changed the law, the Parretti panel has supplied the Court with a way in which to do so. See
Part II.B.3, infra.
19. Wright, 190 U.S. at 40. See also the cases discussed in Part I.C, infra, applying the
special circumstances doctrine to the question of bail release pending extradition proceed-
ings.
20. In a telephone interview with Richard J. Beada, counsel for Mr. Parretti (July 1,
1997) and in a telephone interview with William J. Genego, counsel for Mr. Parretti (July 21,
1997), both lawyers told the author that they will appeal to the Supreme Court if the Ninth
Circuit en banc overrules the decision of the three-judge panel. The author has also inter-
viewed various OIA officials, who have said that the government will appeal the Parretti
decision to the Supreme Court if the decision of the three-judge panel withstands en banc
review.
21. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282 (1978). The subject of interstate domestic extradi-
tion warrants is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment issue
in domestic extradition cases is extremely similar to the Fourth Amendment issue in interna-
tional extraditions, and a review of the domestic cases is helpful in understanding the issue in
the international context. For a useful summary of the domestic cases, see Thomas R.
Trenkner, Annotation, Necessity That Demanding State Show Probable Cause To Arrest
Fugitive In Extradition Proceedings, 90 A.L.R. 3D 1085; Note, Interstate Rendition and the
Fourth Amendment, 24 RUTGERs L.REV. 551 (1970).
Interstate extradition is governed by U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 2; by the federal domestic ex-
tradition statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1994); and by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 11
U.L.A. § 59 (1974) (where adopted by the states). None of these provisions expressly re-
quires that, as a predicate for the issuance of an arrest warrant by a court of the asylum state,
the demanding state furnish the asylum state with an evidentiary showing of probable cause
to believe that the fugitive committed the crime charged. See Trenkner, supra, at 1088. The
early rule appears to have been that no such requirement existed. See id.
[Vol. 19:729
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Doran managed to evade an express ruling on whether the Fourth
Amendment compelled the asylum state to examine the evidence upon
which the requesting state's probable cause determination was made. To
Justice Blackmun, the ruling's emphasis on the Full Faith and Credit
Clause missed the point and failed to address the Fourth Amendment
issue expressly. Dissenting in Doran, Justice Blackmun lay down a
challenge:
I am not willing, as the Court appears to me to be, to bypass so
readily, and almost to ignore, the presence and significance of
However, after Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), in which the Supreme Court ruled
that the Fourth Amendment is fully enforceable against the states, a number of courts have
recognized the necessity that the demanding state furnish the asylum state with sufficient
facts to support a finding of probable cause to believe that the person whose extradition is
sought committed the crime charged. See Trenkner, supra, at 1089. Some courts have held
that even where a probable cause determination has earlier been made in the demanding
state, a second such determination should nevertheless be made in the asylum state, unless
the first determination of probable cause was a grand jury indictment. See id. at 1089-90.
However, some courts have allowed the arrest to be made in the asylum state even before the
supporting documentation of probable cause has been forwarded by the demanding state,
permitting the latter a reasonable time to fill the "affidavit gap"-much akin to the use of
provisional arrest warrants in international extraditions. See, e.g., Grano v. State, 257 A.2d
768, 773-74 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969); In re Simpson, 586 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Kan. Ct. App.
1978).
Even after Mapp, some courts have continued to adhere to the old view that the de-
manding state need not under any circumstances furnish the asylum state with evidence
establishing probable cause that the fugitive committed the crime as a predicate to issuance
of an arrest warrant. See, e.g., In re Ierardi, 321 N.E.2d 921, 924-25 (Mass. 1975). These
courts have emphasized that the purpose of the Constitution's Extradition Clause and of the
state and federal extradition statutes is the expeditious and summary return of the fugitive to
the demanding state, where the fugitive can raise his Fourth Amendment arguments. See id.
at 924. This appears to have been the view of the majority in Doran, which relied on the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. See, e.g., Doran, 439 U.S. at 282. Other courts have said that if a
probable cause showing is required, it is not a full-blown showing that the fugitive commit-
ted the crime charged in the demanding state, but only a limited showing that the fugitive is
duly charged with a crime and that he is a fugitive from justice. See, e.g., State v. Hughes,
229 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Wis. 1975).
Similar arguments have surfaced at one point or another in the recent international ex-
tradition cases in which the probable cause issue has been raised, especially in Parretti, 112
F.3d at 1363. A crucial distinction must be borne in mind, however: namely, that in an inter-
national extradition the demanding country may have charged the fugitive according to
standards and procedures that are radically less mindful of due process considerations than
are U.S. standards. Furthermore, after the fugitive is extradited from the United States to the
demanding country, the courts of that country may not be inclined to hear (let alone redress)
the arrestee's claim that his arrest in the United States violated the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment. In contrast, in a domestic extradition case, a court in the asylum state
can more safely assume that a fugitive who has been charged in another state has at least
been charged according to the probable cause standard that is universally imposed upon all
the states through the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Moreover, courts are required by
the Constitution to give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of the demanding
state. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
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the Fourth Amendment in the extradition context. That
Amendment is not mentioned at all in the discussion portion of
the Court's opinion .... Despite the obvious importance of the
issue, the Court refuses the opportunity afforded by this case to
clarify the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in interstate
extradition. Instead, the Court avoids the question on which
certiorari was granted by holding that, even if the Fourth
Amendment does apply to interstate extradition, its require-
ments, in this case, were satisfied .... This convenient
assumption, in my view, perpetuates Confusion in an area where
clarification and uniformity are urgently needed."
In Parretti, the Ninth Circuit seems to have taken up this challenge.
The Parretti decision is neither an aberration nor an isolated phenome-
non, but the culmination of a series of federal court decisions in the past
two decades in which courts have shown themselves willing to read
more of the Constitution into the process of arrest and detention in in-
ternational extradition cases than in the past.23 The essence of these
decisions-that a greater number of constitutional protections should
apply even in the treaty-based world of the law of arrest and detention in
extraditions-will not easily be dismissed. Petitioners in other extradi-
tion cases will likely view their chances in a new light, emboldened to
attempt similar constitutional challenges to their own extradition pro-
ceedings.
In fact, Parretti and other recent decisions have already complicated
the Government's ability to arrest and detain fugitives wanted by other
countries in pending extradition cases.' The trend of these decisions
may also affect the United States' foreign policy and its relations with
its extradition treaty partners. If the government now finds it more
difficult to arrest and detain foreign fugitives found in the United States,
the Secretary of State may soon find it more difficult both to secure
22. Doran, 439 U.S. at 290-92 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice
Blackmun was concerned with whether the Fourth Amendment should be read to require the
court in an asylum state to examine the evidence relied on by the requesting state in estab-
lishing probable cause. In his view, the Fourth Amendment required that the "asylum state
should be allowed to scrutinize the charging documents ... to ascertain that a detached and
neutral magistrate made a determination of probable cause." Id. at 298. Accordingly, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause'did not excuse a court in the asylum state from its Fourth Amend-
ment obligation to verify the basis for the requesting state's probable cause determination.
23. See Parts I.D and Part I.E, infra.
24. See, e.g., In re Extradition of Michael Peter Spitzauer (No. 97-009M-01) (W.D.
Wash. 1997). In addition to the Spitzauer case, the OIA has confirmed that lawyers in at least
three other extradition matters-in Connecticut, California, and Washington-have raised
Parretti as a defense to arrest and detention of foreign fugitives. Telephone Interview with
Theresa Schubert, Department of Justice, OIA, (July 24, 1997).
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reciprocal arrests of fugitives abroad and to negotiate new extradition
treaties." To the extent that Parretti and its forerunners signal a greater
judicial willingness to extend more constitutional protection to fugitives
in extradition cases, they raise the possibility that future courts will
grant such fugitives a panoply of criminal procedural rights.In some quarters, these decisions will no doubt be welcomed as
long-overdue steps towards modernizing the arcane and sometimes ar-
chaic law of international extradition, much of which pre-dates the
landmark constitutional rulings that have defined our criminal procedure
in this century." Others, however--especially those in the government
who are charged with upholding the United States' treaty obligations-
believe that these decisions will have a chilling effect on the ability of
the Secretary of State to extradite fugitives and will in turn cause our
treaty partners to be less receptive to extradition requests from the
United States."
Part I of this article will describe the historical evolution of U.S.
extradition law as a field parallel to, but separate from, domestic crimi-
nal procedure. Part I will show that the government, rather than having
to make an evidentiary showing of probable cause to believe that the
fugitive actually committed the crime charged in the country requesting
his extradition, has historically been able to obtain a provisional extra-
dition arrest warrant merely upon the sworn statement of a government
25. See Government's Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at
14, Parretti (No. 95-56586):
The resulting "safe harbor" for international fugitives in this circuit will adversely
impact the Secretary of State's ability to comply with treaty obligations and in turn
negotiate the arrest and surrender by foreign countries of fugitives from U.S.
charges. If even a fraction of foreign fugitives flee, it will significantly compro-
mise the enforcement and negotiation of foreign agreements.
Id. at2.
26. As one commentator has observed, extradition case law has been based mainly
upon:
interpretations of antiquated Supreme Court decisions that date mostly from the
four decades that straddle the turn of the twentieth century-an era when consti-
tutional safeguards of criminal procedure were undeveloped and meager, and due
process of law meant something less than it does today .... The time is overdue to
recognize the stakes in extradition hearings and to stop pretending that they are
little more than squabbles over Venue. Before a person ... can be plucked from
home and deposited in the dock of a foreign criminal court, he ought to be allowed
to go beyond usually fruitless challenges to whether on the face of the requesting
papers he is adequately charged with a crime.
Kester, supra note 3, at 1442, 1446 (1988).
,27. "All you need is another case like Parretti, and you've got a huge potential for inter-
national harm. These countries are going to get mighty annoyed, and they will reciprocate
with like treatment." Telephone Interview with Sarah Criscitelli, Department of Justice, OIA
(July 30, 1997).
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attorney "on information and belief' that the fugitive was duly charged
in another country with having committed an offense enumerated as an
extraditable crime in the applicable extradition treaty. Part I will also
describe the longstanding presumption against bail after arrest on an
extradition warrant and the increasing willingness of some courts to
question the traditional justifications for denying international fugitives
in extradition cases some of the constitutional procedural protections
given to domestic criminal defendants.'
Part II of this article describes the Parretti case and the Ninth Cir-
cuit's holding that the federal extradition statutory scheme of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 3184, violates the Fourth Amendment to
the extent that it authorizes the issuance of a provisional arrest warrant
by a court without a prior evidentiary showing of probable cause to be-
lieve that the fugitive committed the crime charged abroad. Part II will
also examine the court's ruling that the longstanding presumption
against bail for an arrestee in an extradition case is an unconstitutional
violation of the accused's Fifth Amendment right to due process to the
extent that it permits his detention even if he can satisfy the court that he
does not pose a risk of flight.
Part III explores some of the implications and effects of Parretti and
the other recent cases questioning the constitutionality of provisional
arrests and detentions, including the ways in which these decisions have
already made the extradition process more difficult for the government.
Finally, Part IV of the article shows that those courts that have
questioned the constitutionality of provisional arrest warrants and the
presumption against bail have relied on several critical assumptions in
arriving at their decisions. While the government has not always chal-
lenged these assumptions, they can and perhaps will be tested in the
event of review by the Supreme Court. The author suggests that the lib-
eralizing trend, if permitted to proceed much further, may serve to
undermine the process of international extradition. Even those who ad-
vocate extending new procedural protections to fugitives may find
future victories hollow, if nations frustrated by the increasing difficulty
of attaining reciprocal extradition resort to new methods outside the ex-
tradition process altogether to secure the return of fugitives.
28. See, e.g., Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903).
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I. BACKGROUND: THE LIMITED NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS IN THE U.S. LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
Because the U.S. federal courts have traditionally taken the view
that the extradition process is not a criminal proceeding in which guilt
or innocence is determined,' they have declined to accord fugitives in
extradition cases many of the procedural safeguards that are available to
criminal defendants. One of the earliest and most frequently cited
statements of this view is found in Justice Harlan's opinion in Neely v.
Henkel,' where the fugitive challenged his extradition on the grounds
that the extradition statute was unconstitutional to the extent that it per-
mitted the fugitive to be sent for trial to a foreign legal system lacking
the procedural safeguards the fugitive would have enjoyed in the United
States:
It is contended that the [extradition statute] is unconstitutional
and void in that it does not secure to the accused, when surren-
dered to a foreign country for trial in its tribunals, all of the
rights, privileges, and immunities that are guaranteed by the
Constitution to persons charged with the commission in this
country of crime against the United States .... The answer to
this suggestion is that those provisions have no relation to
crimes committed without the jurisdiction of the United States
against the laws of a foreign country."
A more modem incarnation of the Neely view can be found in the
opinion of the district court in United States v. Galanis:"
An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the
constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this
country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a
valid treaty.3
29. See supra, note 4.
30. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901). See also Ex parte La Mantia, 206 F. 330
(S.D.N.Y. 1913).
31. Neely, 180 U.S. at 122.
32. United States v. Galanis, 429 F. Supp. 1215 (D. Conn. 1977).
33. Id. at 1224 (citing Neely, 180 U.S. at 109). The Galanis court later staled:
Regardless of what constitutional protections are given to persons held for trial in
the courts of the United States or the constituent states thereof, those protections
cannot be claimed by an accused whose trial and conviction have been held or are
to be held under the laws of another nation, acting according to its traditional
processes and within the scope of its authority and jurisdiction.
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As a result of this view, courts have held that the fugitive has no
right to discovery;4 he may not cross-examine anyone who testifies at
the extradition hearing;35 he may not cross-examine the affiants or
deponents on whose affidavits or depositions the foreign complaint is
based; 6 his right to present evidence at the hearing is severely limited;37
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial does not apply to an
extradition hearing; the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to
Id. (quoting Gallina v. Fraser, 177 F. Supp. 856, 866 (D. Conn. 1959), aff'd 278 F.2d 77 (2d
Cir. 1960)).
The court in Galanis added: "The fact that the United States 'participates' in the argu-
able denial of a constitutional protection by surrendering the defendant.to the demanding
nation does not implicate the United States in an unconstitutional action." Id. at 1224 (citing
Holmes v. Laird, 459 F2d 1211 (D.C. 1972)).
See also Romeo v. Roache, 820 F.2d 540, 543-44 (1st Cir. 1987) ("Extradition proceed-
ings ... are generally not considered criminal prosecutions."); Merino v. United States
Marshal, 326 F.2d 5, 13 (9th Cir. 1963), where the court stated that the nature of an extradi-
tion hearing is akin to a "preliminary hearing:' and that the principles of due process and fair
hearing "are not applicable to a preliminary examination in an international extradition
case."
In a similar vein, the Federal Rules of Evidence state: "Extradition and rendition pro-
ceedings are ... essentially administrative in character." FED. R. EVID. 1101 advisory
committee's note.
34. Messina v. United States, 728 F2d 77 (2d Cir. 1984). The court found no merit in
appellants' contention that the extradition proceedings were deficient because the district
court did not grant appellants' discovery motions. "As has been pointed out repeatedly, '[a]n
extradition hearing is not the occasion for an adjudication of guilt or innocence.'" Id. at 80
(quoting Melia v. United States, 667 F 2d 300, 302 (2d Cir. 1981)).
35. As in the case of a grand jury proceeding, a fugitive has no right to cross-examine
witnesses or introduce evidence to rebut that of the prosecutor. See Charlton v. Kelly, 229
U.S. 447 (1913); see also United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508, 512 (9th Cir. 1976).
36. It is one of the objects of [the extradition statute] to obviate the necessity of
confronting the accused with the witnesses against him; and a construction of this
[statute], or of the treaty, that would require the demanding government to send its
citizens to another country to institute legal proceedings would defeat the whole
object of the treaty.
Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511, 517 (1916).
37. See Messina, 728 F.2d at 80.
38. See Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 485 n.9 (2d Cir. 1976).
Orders of extradition are sui generis. They embody no judgment on the guilt or in-
nocence of the accused but serve only to insure that his culpability will be
determined in another and, in this instance, a foreign forum .... Extradition or-
ders do not, therefore, constitute "final decisions of a district court;' appealable as
of right under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Id. at 482 (citations omitted). "Appellant does not dispute the well-entrenched rule that ex-
tradition proceedings are not to be converted into a dress rehearsal trial." Id. at 484. "[T]he
reasonable doubt standard lies at the foundation of our notions of due process in criminal
cases .... Plainly, however, these interests apply with less force in the context of an interna-
tional extradition proceeding." Id. (citations omitted). "[T]he Sixth Amendment's guarantee
to a speedy trial, limited by its terms to criminal prosecutions, is inapplicable to international
extradition proceedings." Id. at 485 n. 9 (citation omitted).
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extradition proceedings;39 the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do
not apply to extradition hearings;40 a fugitive's right to controvert the
evidence introduced against him is extremely limited;41  the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply in the
context of extradition;42 a fugitive who defeats an extradition attempt
cannot claim the protection of double jeopardy or res judicata in a later
extradition proceeding brought on the same charge;43 the exclusionary
rule does not apply in extradition proceedings;" hearsay is allowed in
extradition proceedings;45 unsworn summaries of witness statements can
As stated in the lower court decision in the same case, "The extradition procedures af-
forded by statute seek to preserve an element of judicial surveillance over a procedure which
is basically an action of international comity." Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 401 F Supp. 1215, 1219,
aff'd, 536 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 362 F. Supp. 1057, 1060
(S.D.N.Y. 1973)); see also Sabatier v. Dambrowski, 453 F. Supp. 1250, 1255 (D.R.I. 1978),
aff'd, 586 F.2d 866 (1st Cir. 1978) (stating that the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial is
not applicable in extradition context).
39. See Melia, 667 F.2d at 302; see also United States ex rel. Klein v. Mulligan, 50 F.2d
687, 688 (2d Cir. 1931) (stating that hearsay evidence is admissible in extradition proceed-
ings). Cf. Merino, 326 F.2d at 5 (stating no authority for applying Federal Rules of Evidence
in extradition proceedings).
40. See FED. R. CRim. P. 54(b)(5) ("These rules are not applicable to extradition and
rendition of fugitives... .").
41. Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1368 (9th Cir. 1978).
42. See id. at 1365 ("[C]onstitutional considerations do not constitute a bar to reinsti-
tuted extradition proceedings... ").
There is no constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy resulting from ex-
tradition to the demanding country ... The Fifth Amendment right not "to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb" is available only to prosecutions in this
country. The essential elements of a plea of double jeopardy are identity of suc-
cessive sovereigns and an identity of alleged offenses.
In re Ryan, 360 F Supp. 270, 274-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1973).
Accord United States ex rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974).
43. Mirchandani v. United States, 836 F.2d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Quinn
v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 786 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The Government is free to reinstitute an
extradition request after it has been denied in a first extradition proceeding."); Hooker, 573
F.2d at 1367-68 (stating that res judicata does not apply because denial of extradition is not a
final judgment on the merits); Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1986); Col-
lins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1923) (letting second extradition request go forward
based on new affidavits); Voloshin v. Ridenour, 299 F 134 (5th Cir. 1924) (allowing second
provisional arrest).
44. Where the court refused to apply the exclusionary rule to extradition proceedings:
Application of the exclusionary rule as urged herein would mean that appellant,
convicted and sentenced to seven years imprisonment in Canada, could gain per-
manent sanctuary in the United States on the ground that his allegedly illegal
arrest in connection with an unrelated crime precluded forever his identification by
Canadian police as "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Simmons v. Braun, 627 F 2d 635, 637 (2d Cir. 1980).
45. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F2d 776, 815 (9th Cir. 1986); see also O'Brien v. Rozman,
554 F2d 780, 783 (6th Cir. 1977) (hearsay permitted); United States ex rel. Klein v. Mulli-
gan, 50 F.2d 687, 688 (2d Cir. 1931).
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be used in support of a finding that the fugitive is extraditable;" and, the
extradition proceeding may go forward even if the accused is not sane.47
Historically, two of the more important procedural anomalies of the
law of arrest and detention in extraditions have been, first, the govern-
ment's ability to obtain a provisional arrest warrant for an international
fugitive without having to make an evidentiary showing of probable
cause to believe that the fugitive committed the crime charged, and
second, the nearly irrebuttable presumption that the fugitive, once ar-
rested, should remain detained pending the extradition proceedings.49
Both practices have been established for nearly a hundred years; both
have recently come under increasing scrutiny and criticism; and both
were firmly declared unconstitutional for the first time by the three-
judge panel in Parretti. They are discussed in turn in the sections that
follow.
A. The Government's Ability to Obtain a Provisional Arrest
Warrant without Making a Prior Evidentiary Showing
of Probable Cause to Believe That the Fugitive
Committed the Offense Charged Abroad
One of the most important quirks of extradition law has been the
government's ability to obtain a provisional arrest warrant from a judge
or magistrate in aid of an impending extradition request by a foreign
government without having to make an evidentiary showing of probable
cause to believe that the fugitive actually committed the crime charged
abroad.50 The federal extradition statutory scheme has never by its terms
required an evidentiary submission as a predicate for the issuance of a
provisional arrest warrant. Prior to Parretti, no court had decided ex-
pressly whether the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment required
that the government make an evidentiary showing of probable cause to
believe that a crime had been committed, and that the fugitive commit-
ted it, before a provisional warrant properly could issue in an
international extradition case.
46. Zanazanian v. United States, 729 F2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Emami v.
United States District Court, 834 F.2d 1444, 1450-51 (9th Cir. 1987).
47. Romeo v. Roache, 820 F.2d 540, 544 (1st Cir. 1987). Romeo relied on Charlton v.
Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 462 (1913) (holding, without discussing due process, that evidence of
insanity is not to be considered on habeas corpus), and declined to follow In re Extradition of
Artukovic, 628 F. Supp. 1370, 1375 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that fifth and sixth amend-
ments bar extradition proceeding if accused is incompetent).
48. See Part L.A, infra.
49. See Part I.C., infra,
50. See, e.g., Exparte Sternaman, 77 . 595, 597 (N.D.N.Y. 1896).
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Nearly a hundred years ago, however, the issue was raised at least
implicitly in several extradition cases before the Supreme Court. While
the Court offered language which appeared to favor a requirement that
warrants be based on attached depositions or other documentary evi-
dence, it also offered conflicting language suggesting that warrants
could issue merely on "information and belief '"51 Moreover, the Court
appeared to embrace a lower court decision holding that an extradition
arrest warrant could properly be obtained on information and belief
alone.52 In Ex Parte Sternaman, the district court set forth what the Su-
preme Court would later describe as "the general doctrine in respect of
extradition complaints " '53 Interpreting the requirements of the extradi-
tion statute, the court in Sternaman stated:
The complaint.., need not be drawn with the formal precision
of an indictment. If it be sufficiently explicit to inform the ac-
cused person of the precise nature of the charge against him it is
sufficient. The extreme technicality with which these proceed-
ings were formerly conducted has given place to a more liberal
practice, the object being to reach a correct decision upon the
main question-is there reasonable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed? The complaint may, in some instances, be
upon information and belief. The exigencies may be such that
the criminal may escape punishment unless he is promptly ap-
prehended by the representatives of the country whose laws he
has violated. From the very nature of the case it may often hap-
pen that such representative can have no personal knowledge of
the crime. If the offense be one of the treaty crimes, and if it be
stated clearly and explicitly so that the accused knows exactly
what the charge is, the complaint is sufficient to authorize the
commissioner to act.'
Before it endorsed Sternaman in Yordi, the Supreme Court ap-
peared to suggest in an earlier case that an extradition arrest warrant
should be supported by documentary evidence." In Rice v. Ames, the
51. Rice, 180 U.S. at 371; see Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 193 (1902); Yordi v. Nolte,
215 U.S. 227 (1909).
52. Yordi, 215 U.S. at 230, citing Exparte Sternaman, 77 F at 597.
53. Yordi, 215 U.S. at 230.
54. Ex Parte Sternaman, 77 F. at 596-97. The court in Sternaman then stated that the
"foregoing propositions are, it is thought, sustained by the following authorities: In re Farez,
7 Blatchf. 345, Fed. Cas. No. 4,645; In re Roth, 15 Fed. 506; In re Henrich, 5 Blatchf. 414,
Fed. Cas. No. 6,369; Ex parte Van Hoven, 4 Dill. 415, Fed. Cas. No. 16,859; In re Breen, 73
Fed. 458; Ex parte Lane, 6 Fed. 34; In re Herres, 33 Fed. 165; Castro v. De Uriarte, 16 Fed.
93; In re Macdonnell, 11 Blatchf. 79, Fed. Cas. No. 8,771." Id. at 597.
55. Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371 (1901).
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Court ruled that several counts of a complaint in an extradition matter
were legally insufficient,
since the charges were made solely upon information and belief,
and no attempt was made even to set forth the sources of
information or the grounds of affiant's belief. This is bad, even
in extradition proceedings, which are entitled to as much
liberality of construction in furtherance of the objects of the
treaty as is possible in cases of a criminal nature .... A citizen
ought not to be deprived of his personal liberty upon an
allegation which, upon being sifted, may amount to nothing
more than a suspicion .... We do not wish, however, to be
understood as holding that, in extradition proceedings, the
complaint must be sworn to by persons having actual
knowledge of the offense charged. This would defeat the whole
object of the treaty ... [The extradition statute makes special
provision that the complaint may be accompanied with]
depositions, warrants or other papers offered in evidence .... If
the officer of the foreign government has no personal
knowledge of the facts, he may with entire propriety make the
complaint upon information and belief, stating the sources of
his information and the grounds of his belief, and annexing to
the complaint a properly certified copy of any indictment or
equivalent proceeding, which may have been found in the
foreign country, or a copy of the depositions of witnesses having
actual knowledge of the facts .... This will afford ample
authority to the commissioner for issuing the warrant. 6
Thus, to the extent that the Court in Rice appeared to permit the is-
suance of an arrest warrant on information and belief, supported only by
a statement of the source or grounds for that belief and by an attached
copy of the foreign indictment, the Court appears to have shied away
from requiring an evidentiary showing of probable cause.
Just a few years later, the Court stated in Grin v. Shine:
In the construction and carrying out of [extradition] treaties the
ordinary technicalities of criminal proceedings are applicable
only to a limited extent. Foreign powers are not expected to be
versed in the niceties of our criminal laws, and proceedings for
a surrender are not such as put in issue the life or liberty of the
accused .... [W]here the [extradition] proceeding is manifestly
taken in good faith, a technical noncompliance with some
56. Rice, 180 U.S. at 374-76.
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formality of criminal procedure should not be allowed to stand
in the way of a faithful discharge of our obligations .... All that
is required by ... [the extradition statute] is that a complaint
shall be made under oath. It may be made by any person acting
under the authority of the foreign government having
knowledge of the facts, or in the absence of such person, by the
official representative of the foreign government based upon
depositions in his possession."
The Grin Court did not indicate whether the issuing U.S. magistrate
ought to see copies of these depositions before issuing a warrant, or
whether it was sufficient that the magistrate merely be assured that the
foreign authorities had such depositions in their possession before they
made their complaint. 8
In Yordi, the Court seized upon Rice's use of the phrase "upon in-
formation and belief' with apparent approval, without emphasizing
what it had emphasized in Rice, namely, that a complaint sworn to on
information and belief should ideally be supported by attached deposi-
tions of witnesses having actual knowledge of the facts. 9 In Yordi-
which is summarized in the syllabus of the United States Reports as
standing for the proposition that the evidentiary record from the de-
manding country need not be fastened to the U.S. complaint so long as
the complaint so clearly and explicitly states a treaty crime that the ac-
cused knows the nature of the foreign charge6 -the Court found that the
magistrate actually had reviewed depositions in the foreign case. While
the demanding country had not transmitted these depositions to the
court at the time it sought the fugitive's arrest, it had supplied them in
an earlier hearing involving the same fugitive, and the issuing commis-
sioner had made clear his reliance on them in issuing the extradition
arrest warrant. "We think the evidence produced at the [earlier] hearing
justified the detention of the accused and corrected any irregularity in
the complaint" 6' Thus, the syllabus' summary of Yordi notwithstanding,
the case can be read for the proposition that an arrest warrant applica-
tion in an extradition case should be based upon some form of attached
deposition or documentary evidence and not merely on a government
lawyer's allegations on information and belief.
The Court then appeared to retreat from an evidentiary requirement
in the 1911 case of Glucksman v. Henkel: "The complaint is sworn to
57. Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 184-85, 193 (1902).
58. See id.
59. See Yordi, 215 U.S. at 231 (citing Rice, 180 U.S. at 371).
60. Id. at 227-233
61. Id. at 232.
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upon information and belief, but it is supported by the testimony of wit-
nesses who are stated to have been deposed and whom therefore we
must presume to have been sworn. That is enough."62 Here, although the
Court arguably endorsed the proposition that the complaint should be
supported by witness testimony, it made the requirement less meaning-
ful by allowing such "testimony" without assurances that the witnesses
were sworn under oath at the time they testified. 3
Fourteen years after Glucksman the Court endorsed yet another
complaint sworn on information and belief, in Fernandez v. Phillips.
"[The complaint] alleged that the complainant was informed 'through
the diplomatic channel' that the appellant was duly and legally charged
[in Mexico] with the crime, and on behalf of that government prayed the
arrest. Of course whatever form of words was used, the complaint nec-
essarily was upon information ... ."" However, the Court noted with
approval that by the time of the extradition hearing, many pages of evi-
dence had been appended to the complaint.'
B. Provisional Arrests in Aid of Extradition
Requests: Modern Practice
The modern-day legacy of Sternaman, Fernandez, and Yordi is that
the government, when seeking provisional arrest warrants for fugitives
in international extradition matters, has been allowed to furnish the
court with a complaint and warrant application specifying only a mini-
mum of information.' Specifically, when faced with a diplomatic
62. Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 514 (1911) (citing Rice, 180 U.S. at 375).
63 Id. at 514.
64. Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 313 (1925).
65. Id. at 313.
66. This includes the fugitive's name, the offense charged, the date and place that the
charging instrument was issued, the circumstances of the crime, the inclusion of the offense
in the applicable extradition treaty as an extraditable offense, a description and identification
of the accused, and his whereabouts, if known.
The policy of the U.S. government is to accommodate such requests 'in the best
possible way,' even though presumably such requests will be granted only if the
necessary documentation includes information that the fugitive is likely to flee be-
fore the formal request is filed and an opportunity for an arrest warrant to issue
pursuant thereto.
BASSlOUNI, supra note 2, at 525. (citing 1975 U.S. Department of State, Digest of United
States Practice in International Law, 175-76).
See also United States ex Rel. Petrushansky v. Marasco, 325 F.2d 562 (2d.Cir. 1963).
See, e.g., In re Kraiselburd, 786 F.2d 1395, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kennedy, J.) ("A re-
quest for provisional arrest [under treaty with Argentina] need only be accompanied by a
declaration that an arrest warrant exists ...."); United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 554
(8th Cir. 1984) (explaining that provisional arrest requires only complaint alleging existence
of treaty and that fugitive committed a crime enumerated therein).
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request by foreign authorities for the issuance of a provisional arrest
warrant for a fugitive found in the United States, the Department of Jus-
tice has used a form complaint and warrant application for submission
to the appropriate judicial officer in the judicial district where the fugi-
tive has been discovered. The complaint form, typically executed and
sworn to on information and belief by an Assistant United States Attor-
ney (AUSA) in that district, cites Title 18, United States Code, Section
3184 for the authority to request a provisional arrest warrant.67 The form
requires the inclusion of only the following information: (1) the exis-
tence and nature of the foreign charge against the fugitive; (2) the
existence of a foreign warrant for the arrest of the fugitive; (3) a brief
synopsis of the facts underlying the foreign charge; (4) a statement that
the fugitive is believed to be in the United States, and a more specific
indication of his whereabouts, if known; (5) a physical description of
the fugitive; (6) a request for a provisional arrest warrant; (7) a state-
ment that the AUSA has been informed through the diplomatic channel
that the foreign country will make a formal diplomatic request for ex-
tradition of the fugitive within the period of time allowed by the relevant
extradition treaty; and (8) the fugitive poses a risk of flight. 6
67. The authority of federal and state courts to issue warrants of arrest in aid of extradi-
tion requests has always been established by the federal extradition statute, which is
presently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994):
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States
and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States, or any
magistrate authorized so to do by a court of the United States, or any judge of a
court of record of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made un-
der oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having
committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the
crimes provided for by such treaty or convention, issue his warrant for the appre-
hension of the person so charged, that he may be brought before such justice,
judge, or magistrate, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and
considered. Such complaint may be filed before and such warrant may be issued
by a judge or magistrate of the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia if the whereabouts within the United States of the person charged are not
known or, if there is reason to believe the person will shortly enter the United
States. If, on such hearing, he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge
under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention, he shall certify the same,
together with a copy of all the testimony taken before him, to the Secretary of
State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of the proper authorities of
such foreign government, for the surrender of such person, according to the stipu-
lations of the treaty or convention; and he shall issue his warrant for the
commitment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there to remain until such
surrender shall be made.
18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994).
68. See, e.g., Complaint in In re Extradition of Spitzauer (W.D. Wash.) (CR97-09M). By
contrast, the United States Attorneys' Manual urges U.S. prosecutors seeking the provisional
arrest abroad of a fugitive from American justice to provide the foreign authorities with
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The form has never required that the prosecutor state the source of
the information verifying the existence of the underlying foreign charge.
Nor has the form required the inclusion of particular facts to support the
government's belief that the accused poses a risk of flight. On the form,
the government simply requests that a provisional arrest warrant be is-
sued pursuant to Section 3184 and that the court "take such other
actions" as required by the provisions of the relevant treaty, "including
the seizure of any items or materials in the fugitive's possession at the
time of apprehension. ''
It is important to emphasize that the statutory scheme permits the
government to seek-and the court to issue-a provisional arrest war-
rant even before the requesting country has made a formal extradition
request or supplied the U.S. court with affidavits or other competent
evidence that the fugitive committed a crime. ° Most extradition treaties
specify a deadline following (rather than prior to) the fugitive's arrest by
which the requesting country must gather and transmit through the dip-
lomatic channel the various charging documents, affidavits, ambassa-
dorial or consular certifications, translations, and apostilles which the
government will in turn submit to the court for consideration at a formal
extradition hearing on the government's request for an order certifying
the extraditability of the fugitive.7 Thus, unlike domestic federal cases
"sufficient information ... to establish probable cause that a crime was committed and that
the fugitive committed it." USAM at 9-15.23 1.
69. See Complaint at 2, Spitzauer (CR97-09M). The reference in the form complaint to
the seizure of the fugitive's property is included because many extradition treaties to which
the United States is a party include a provision for the seizure of any items which could be
used as evidence against the fugitive after he is returned to the requesting country for trial.
See, e.g., Extradition Treaty of 1930 and Amendments, Jan. 31, 1930, U.S.-Austria art. X, 46
Stat. 2779. If the fugitive is ultimately extradited, the seized evidence is surrendered with
him to the requesting country.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994).
71. Id. The individual treaties specify various deadlines by which the requesting country
must transmit the formal extradition request, including the documentary evidence upon
which the government will rely at the extradition hearing on its request for an order from the
court certifying to the Secretary of State that the fugitive is extraditable. Some treaties re-
quire the transmittal to be made within forty-five days of the fugitive's arrest. Others allow
sixty days, and still others [i.e., Austria] up to ninety days to elapse before the documentary
evidence must be transmitted.
At the formal extradition hearing, which can be held as long as three months after the
fugitive's arrest (or even longer, if the fugitive requests more time to prepare for the hearing),
"the evidence of criminality may be heard." Id. The government's burden at the hearing is to
establish that: (1) there are criminal charges pending in the requesting state; (2) the charges
are included in the relevant treaty as extraditable offenses; (3) the extradition treaty is of full
force and effect; and (4) the documentary evidence transmitted by the requesting country
establishes probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the person before
the court committed it. See, e.g., United States v. Barr, 619 F. Supp. 1068, 1070 (E.D. Pa.
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in which the government is required to make an evidentiary showing of
probable cause before the court will issue an arrest warrant, in extradi-
tion cases the government has been able to arrest a fugitive pro-
visionally and then wait until the formal extradition hearing months
later before making an evidentiary showing of probable cause.72 Formal
extradition hearings have routinely occurred three or more months after
arrest."'
The justification for provisional arrest has traditionally been the im-
perative that the fugitive, once located, be seized immediately, before he
has a chance to flee-an imperative which cannot wait while the
authorities in the requesting nation laboriously assemble, translate, cer-
tify, and transmit the documentary evidence upon which a finding of
probable cause can be made.'
When an alleged fugitive has been located in a foreign country
it is often important to effect his arrest at once to prevent his
1985). At the hearing, the accused is given an opportunity to challenge whether the govern-
ment has met its burden in any of these regards. Barr, 619 F Supp. at 1070.
72. "Generally, the only prerequisite for obtaining the provisional arrest of an alleged
fugitive is the existence, in the requesting State, of a warrant of arrest issued by competent
authority." WHrrEMAN, supra note 2, at 931. Furthermore, Whiteman writes, "Generally, the
provisional arrest and detention of an alleged fugitive may be obtained by the requesting
State on the basis of a minimum of information." Id. at 929.
Well before Parreni, several commentators raised the question of whether the Fourth
Amendment's guarantees should not apply to the issuance of provisional arrest warrants.
[The] question which arises in the context of provisional arrest is whether or not
there must be a standard of "probable cause" to be found. This question raises the
issue of the applicability of the Fourth Amendment, protecting against unreason-
able searches and seizures. The question thus arises as to whether "provisional
arrest" can be made without "probable cause" or is based on a lesser standard.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 2, at 527. See also Kester, supra note 3, at 1464.
Before Parretti, several courts questioned whether the issuance of a provisional warrant
without a predicate showing of probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment, but these
courts managed to skirt the constitutional question which the Parretti panel felt it had no
choice but to decide. See United States v. Williams, 480 F. Supp. 482, 485 (D. Mass. 1979)
(expressing doubt as to the constitutionality of a thirty-six day provisional detention based
solely on information that the fugitive had been charged with an extraditable crime), rev'd on
other grounds, 611 F.2d 914 (1st Cir. 1979); Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 748 (2d Cir.
1980); In re Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1217 (5th Cir. 1986); Sahagian v. United
States, 864 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1988); Spatola v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 362, 366
(E.D.N.Y. 1990). These cases are discussed Part I.E., infra.
73. Telephone Interview with John Harris, Department of Justice, OIA (Sept. 10, 1997).
74. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 2, at 526.
It might readily happen that the foreign representative might have no knowledge
of the facts necessary to be embodied in a complaint, and have no documentary
evidence at hand to prove them. In such a case if a complaint could not be made
... the surrender might easily be defeated by flight of the accused.
Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 194 (1902).
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further flight. For this purpose, most extradition laws and trea-
ties provide that the alleged fugitive may be arrested and
temporarily detained for a period of time to enable the request-
ing State to furnish the necessary documentation in support of
its request for his extradition."
One scholar has observed that the essential purpose of the provi-
sional arrest warrant
is to detain an individual for fear that he may flee pending arri-
val of the formal documents of extradition. The practice and
practicality of situations in which a 'provisional arrest' is re-
quested are that the requesting state rushes its request in the
form of a telex or diplomatic cable that states a few facts, sel-
dom sending with it sufficient evidence that would satisfy a U.S.
judge that some evidence of 'probable cause' exists.76
Thus, the standard for obtaining a provisional arrest warrant in an
extradition matter has been considerably less burdensome on the
75. WHITEMAN, supra note 2, at 920.
76. BASSIOUNI, supra note 2, at 526. At least one court has taken the view that the
"urgency" justifying a provisional arrest need not be "merely temporal in nature" but can
involve "other considerations including importance to the country seeking extradition and
foreign policy concerns of the United States." United States v. Leitner, 784 F2d 159, 161 (2d
Cir. 1986).
It is true that the treaty partners moved slowly in arresting Leitner, and we take
with a grain of salt the Government's claim that it could not locate him, despite the
fact that he was driving a taxi and going to law school under his own name and
apparently visiting his parents almost every weekend. [The district judge] did not
explicitly address the urgency question, but he did find that the interest in pro-
ducing extraditable persons "is magnified where a defendant is charged with acts
of terrorism." . . . [Hie treated "urgency" as less related to immediacy than to the
importance of the case given the nature of the crime, the risk of flight, and the in-
terests of the countries in extradition. The broader interpretation of the term that
takes into account the interests of the treaty parties seems the appropriate one.
Id.
Information as to the "urgency" of provisional arrests seems to have been included in
applications for provisional arrest warrants as early as the nineteenth century, as the court
noted in United States v. Messina, 566 F. Supp. 740, 743-44 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). See, e.g., De-
partment of State, Memorandum Relative to the Extradition of Fugitives from the United
States in British Jurisdiction, app. 2, May 1890, (reprinted in IV J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 606, at 359, 361 (1906)). "It is clear that the rationale for provi-
sional arrest is to prevent flight in advance of the formal request. Thus extradition treaties
frequently provide for such arrest '[w]ith a view to preventing the escape of alleged fugitives
from justice.'" Messina, 566 F. Supp. at 743 (quoting IV G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 326, at 103 (1942)). As the court in Messina observed, by 1968 most
extradition treaties permitted provisional arrest to effect a fugitive's arrest at once to prevent
his further flight. Id. (quoting 6 M. WHITEmAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 25, at 920
(1968)).
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government than the standard for obtaining an arrest warrant in a
domestic criminal case. To obtain an arrest warrant in a domestic
criminal case, the government must provide the judicial officer with
competent evidence yielding a "substantial basis for... concluding that
probable cause exist[s]."'7 By "competent evidence" the court means
sworn affidavits or testimony that would "warrant a man of reasonable
caution" to believe that the suspect has committed a crime.78 By
contrast, when the government has sought provisional arrest warrants in
extradition matters, it has not been required to show competent evidence
supporting probable cause. Instead, the government has been required to
provide little more than a synopsis of the charges brought by the
requesting country.
C. The Presumption That the Fugitive, once Arrested, Should Remain
Detained Pending the Extradition Proceeding:
The Doctrine of Special Circumstances
Ninety-four years ago the Supreme Court held that a person arrested
on an extradition warrant carries the burden of demonstrating to the sat-
isfaction of the court that there are "special circumstances" justifying
bail.9 In Wright v. Henkel, the Court premised a presumption against
bail in extradition matters on the United States' compelling interest in
fulfilling treaty obligations:
The demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty
and the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the ac-
cused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other
government is under obligation to make the surrender; an obli-
gation which it might be impossible to fulfill if release on bail
were permitted °
Thus, "while bail should not ordinarily be granted," a court may
extend such relief after considering any applicable "special circum-
stances " '8 Ever since Wright, the courts of every circuit have applied a
presumption against bail in extradition proceedings and have required a
77. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983) (quoting Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 271 (1960)); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
78. d; see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967) ("Probable cause under the
Fourth Amendment exists where the facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge,
and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient unto themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe than an offense has been or is being commit-
ted.").
79. Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 63 (1903).
80. Id. at 62.
81. Id. at 63.
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showing of "special circumstances" to justify release." As a practical
matter, arrestees have rarely been able to demonstrate special circum-
stances, 3 a challenge which has often resembled passing the proverbial
camel through the eye of the needle."
82. The extradition statutory scheme, 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994), does not address the
question of bail. And, because international extradition matters are not considered criminal
cases, courts have held that the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (1994), which governs
the allowance of bail in domestic criminal cases and applies only to offenses against the
United States that are triable in U.S. courts, does not apply in extraditions. See, e.g., Kanrin
v. United States, 725 F2d 1225, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). Thus, given the absence of statu-
tory guidance, the question of bail in extradition matters has been determined by looking to
federal caselaw, starting with Wright v. Henkel.
Since Wright v. Henkel was decided in 1903, the federal courts have frequently held that
bail ordinarily should not be allowed in international extradition proceedings, and should be
permitted only when special circumstances exist. See generally In re Kirby, 106 F3d 855,
858 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Leitner, 784 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1986) (per curiam);
United States v. Williams, 611 F2d 914 (1st Cir. 1979); Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 649 F.2d
914 (2d Cir. 1981). See, e.g., Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 827 n.4 (1lth Cir. 1993) (court
is "bound by Supreme Court and ... Circuit precedent" to apply "special circumstances"
standard); Salerno v. United States, 878 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying "special circum-
stances" test); Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 554 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977) ("Unlike the situation for
domestic crimes, there is no presumption favoring bail. The reverse is rather the case.");
United States v. Taitz, 130 FR.D. 442, 444, 446 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (suggesting that even where
a person demonstrates that he is not a flight risk, he is not entitled to bail unless he can also
show "special circumstances"); In re Klein, 46 F.2d 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (bail poses "grave
risk of frustrating the efforts of the executive branch of the government to fulfill treaty obli-
gations:'); United States ex rel. McNamara v. Henkel, 46 F.2d 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1912)
("[Aidmission to bail and extradition should be in practice an unusual and extraordinary
thing."); In re Mitchell, 171 F. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1909) (allowing bail in extradition proceedings
"only in the most pressing circumstances, and when the requirements of justice are abso-
lutely peremptory.").
83. The courts have found that most circumstances are not "special": In re Extradition of
Russell, 805 F2d 1215, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1986) ("being a tolerable bail risk is not in and of
itself a 'special circumstance."'); Kamrin, 725 F2d at 1228; Williams, 611 F2d at 915; United
States v. Hills, 765 F Supp. 381 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (absence of flight risk, involvement in civil
litigation, and claim of constitutional and procedural defenses to raise later at extradition hear-
ing did not overcome presumption against bail); Leitner, 784 F2d at 159; Klein, 46 F2d at 85;
Russell, 805 F2d at 1217 (neither financial hardship, nor the need to consult with attorney about
pending civil lawsuit or about the extradition matter itself amount to special circumstances); In
re Extradition of Artukovic, 628 F Supp. 1370, 1374-75 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (neither advanced age
nor infirmity comprise special circumstances); In re Extradition of Smyth, 976 F2d 1535 (9th
Cir. 1992) (absence of flight risk and need to consult with counsel and witnesses in complex
extradition do not amount to special circumstances); United States v. Tang Yee-Chun, 657 F
Supp. 1270, 1271-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Koskotas v. Roche, 931 F2d 169, 175 (1st Cir. 1991)
(arrestee's involvement in other civil proceedings is not a special circumstance); In re Extradi-
tion of Rouvier, 839 F Supp. 537, 540-41 (N.D. fI1. 1993) (availability of bail in requesting
country is not a special circumstance).
84. Special circumstances have occasionally been found, including some which other
courts have found not to be special: Mitchell, 171 F at 290 (release on bond so respondent could
attend civil trial which would affect greatly his interests, but with proviso that he be returned to
custody when trial was over); Hu Yau-Leung, 649 F2d at 914 (special circumstances existed
where fugitive was only sixteen years old and no suitable juvenile detention facility was avail-
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By comparison, in domestic criminal cases the presumption ordi-
narily has been that an arrestee should be released on bail or bond
unless the government moves for his detention and proves he presents
either a risk of flight or a danger to the community."
able); United States v. Taitz, 130 F.R.D. 442 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (combination of unusual factors
amounted to special circumstances, including: health problems experienced by fugitive during
incarceration; bail would have been available in requesting country; detention was overly re-
strictive of fugitive's religious freedom; and, fugitive 'made prima facie showing that crime
charged abroad might not be an extraditable offense under the treaty); In re Extradition of Mo-
rales, 906 F Supp. 1368, 1375 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (unusual delay in conducting extradition hearing
was a special circumstance); United States v. Kin-Hong, 83 E3d 523, 524 (1st Cir. 1996)
("'special circumstances' may include a delayed extradition hearing"); Salerno, 878 F2d at 317
(unusual delay in the appeal process can be a special circumstance that will justify bail under the
Wright v. Henkel standard); In re Extradition of Kirby, 106 F3d 855, 863-65 (9th Cir. 1996)
(special circumstances shown by combination of five factors, including (1) long delays during
extradition proceedings, (2) a similarly-situated fugitive in a related extradition case had been
granted bail, (3) requesting country likely would not credit arrestees for time spent in U.S. cus-
tody, (4) a 'cloud' hung over the proceedings because a court in an unrelated case had declared
the extradition statute unconstitutional, and (5) arrestees, who were Irish Republican Army
supporters wanted by Great Britain, enjoyed the "sympathy and concern" of many Americans);
In re Extradition of Nacif-Borge, 829 F Supp. 1210, 1221 (D. Nev. 1993) (special circumstance
existed where bail would have been available in requesting country if defendant could post
security in amount of eighty percent of alleged tax debt, and where fugitive posed no risk of
flight or danger to community); and, In re Gannon, 27 F2d 362 (E.D. Pa. 1928) (determining
that availability of bail in requesting country was special circumstance). Compare Gannon and
Nacif-Borge with Rouvier, 839 F Supp. at 540-41 (rejecting as contradictory to Supreme Court
and federal appellate decisions view that entitlement to bail in requesting country is special
circumstance, since most arrestees would be entitled to bail, contravening longstanding pre-
sumption that bail should be the exception rather than the rule).
One court surveyed "the more contemporary reported cases" and reported that "granting of
bail pending completion of the extradition proceedings has been the rule rather than the excep-
tion?' Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 430 F Supp. 915, 916 n.2 (D. Mass. 1977), rev'd, 553 F2d 92 (1st
Cir. 1977). The district court in Beaulieu cited and discussed only six cases, however.
In a number of cases in which bail has been granted, the courts have done so with no dis-
cussion of whether special circumstances were found. See, e.g., Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247,
1249 (4th Cir. 1976); Vardy v. United States, 529 F.2d 404, 405 (5th Cir. 1976); Shapiro v. Fer-
randina, 478 F2d 894, 898 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Clark, 470 F Supp. 976, 977 (D. Vt.
1979); In re Sindona, 450 F Supp. 672, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); United States v. Galanis, 429 F
Supp. 1215, 1231 (D. Conn. 1977); Jhirad v. Ferrandina; 355 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
rev'd on other grounds, 486 F2d 442 (2d Cir. 1973); Wacker v. Bisson, 370 F.2d 552 (5th Cir.
1967); In re Extradition of D'Amico, 177 F Supp. 648,650 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
85. Ever since the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal law has provided a conditional
right to bail for defendants arrested on criminal charges. That Act provided, in relevant part:
And upon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except where the pun-
ishment may be death, in which cases it shall not be admitted but by the supreme or a
circuit court, or by a justice of the supreme court, or a judge of a district court, who
shall exercise their discretion ....
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (1789) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3141-50 (1986)). Under the current bail statute, the presumption of pretrial release is still the
rule, but the statute authorizes pretrial detention of persons charged with certain serious felonies
upon a finding that no conditions of release can reasonably assure their appearance at trial or the
safety of any other person or of the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e-g). The government
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Until the Parretti case, no court had addressed the question of whether
the application of the special circumstances test in denying bail in the ab-
sence of a finding of flight risk violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.g There were, however, indications that the special cir-
cumstances doctrine might be vulnerable to a constitutional challenge. 7
D. The Trend toward Increasing Scrutiny of the Special
Circumstances Doctrine and of the Presumption
against Bail in Extradition Proceedings
In the decade prior to Parretti, courts and commentators began to
question the constitutionality of both the doctrine of special
circumstances and the presumption against bail in extradition cases."
As one commentator has noted, "the United States cases on bail in
extradition are all over the lot, and the 'special circumstances' rule
frequently breaks down ..... [T]o deny prehearing release to
[someone] who would qualify if charged in a federal indictment, for
instance, would make no sense at all. The best approach [would be] to
analyze all extradition cases ip terms of risk of flight."89 Another
observer has iemarked that "courts in international extradition cases
should focus on the accused's risk of flight rather than on the presence
or absence of 'special circumstances,' "90 although this same observer
carries the burden, of showing that detention is appropriate, although there is now a rebuttable
presumption that detention should be ordered in cases where the defendant is charged with cer-
tain serious felonies which could be punished by imprisonment of ten or more years. See 18
U.S.C. § 1342(e).
86. See Parretti v. United States, 112 F.3d 1363, 1381 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The government,
apparently conceding that no court has ever discussed or even alluded to the due process ques-
tion, responds that Wright v. Henkel ... and its progeny have held sub silentio that the 'special
circumstances' standard is constitutional by repeatedly applying it to deny bail in extradition
cases").
87. See generally United States v. Messina, 566 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("[T]here
may be [a constitutional] question when American citizens are held without bail in advance
of a formal extradition request and without a showing of exigent circumstances.").
88. See Part I.E., infra.
89. Kester, supra note 3, at 1449.
90. Hall, supra note 17, at 600.
To imprison a defendant (who cannot show "special circumstances") in the name
of national interests when the defendant presents no perceptible risk to those inter-
ests (because he poses no perceptible risk of flight) smacks of a punitive restraint,
proscribed by the due process clause .. . . Risk of flight is the most crucial factor
(in the bail decision) in protecting the national interests in extradition. So long as
the accused poses no threat to the community, the national interests are fully
served if the accused does not abscond. That the accused presents "special circum-
stances" adds nothing to the protection of these interests. Conversely, if the
accused is likely to flee, the governmental interests are vulnerable, no matter what
the "special circumstances:'
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added that "the burden of proving acceptability of release is properly
on the arrestee."9'
In a similar vein, the court in the 1983 case of United States v.
Messina92 assessed the government's claimed justifications for the fugi-
tive's provisional arrest and his detention during the extradition
proceedings and stated:
The court does not suggest that the rule of Wright v. Henkel is
constitutionally infirm .... Nevertheless, the question of ur-
gency goes to the question of whether there are 'legitimate
reasons' for detaining a person with a presumption against bail
.... [T]here may be an eighth amendment question when
American citizens are held without bail in advance of a formal
extradition request and without a showing of exigent circum-
stances. '93
In the 1977 case of Beaulieu v. Hartigan,94 the district judge sur-
veyed recent cases dealing with the issue of bail in the extradition
setting and concluded:
In none of the cases ... was a district judge who granted bail
subsequently reversed by a reviewing court. Analysis of these
cases leads me to the conclusion that the 'special circum-
stances' doctrine of Wright, though still viable, must be viewed,
in the light of modern concepts of fundamental fairness, as pro-
viding a district judge with flexibility and discretion in
considering whether bail should be granted in these extradition
cases. The standard of scrutiny and concern exercised by a dis-
trict judge in an extradition case should be greater than in the
typical bail situation, given the delicate nature of international
relations. But one of the basic questions facing a district judge
in either situation 'is whether, under all the circumstances, the
petitioner is likely to return when directed to do so. Fundamen-
tally, it is a judgment call by the district court based on the
Id. at 614-15.
See also, Note, The Right to Bail in United States Extradition Proceedings, 1983 MICH.
1 Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 107 (1983).
91. Hall, supra note 90, at 613.
92. Messina, 566 F. Supp. at 745.
93. Id. (citations omitted). The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. An unreasonable denial of
bail might violate the excessive bail clause. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) ("Bail set at
a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated [to ensure the defendant's presence at
trial] is 'excessive' under the Eighth Amendment.").
94. Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 430 F. Supp. 915, 917 (D. Mass. 1977), rev'd, 553 F.2d 92 (1st
Cir. .1977), vacated, 554 F2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977).
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totality of the circumstances, including the extremely important
consideration of this country's treaty agreements with other na-
tions."
Finally, in a case pre-dating Parretti, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a
denial of bail because of the seriousness of the offense charged and the
considerable risk of flight, but made no reference to Wright v. Henkel or
the doctrine of special circumstances. 96 The suggestion is that the court
approached the issue primarily from the standpoint of flight risk.9
E. The Trend toward Increasing Judicial Scrutiny of
Provisional Arrest Warrants
Just as some courts have shown a growing uneasiness with the spe-
cial circumstances doctrine, others have shown a similar discomfort
with provisional arrest warrants issued without a prior evidentiary
showing of probable cause. In the past ten years, several appellate pan-
els of the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, and
Seventh Circuits have questioned the constitutionality of allowing a
provisional arrest warrant to issue without a prior evidentiary showing
of probable cause but have managed to avoid deciding the constitutional
issue.9 Nevertheless, these courts appear to have signaled a growing
judicial impatience with the traditional justifications for allowing provi-
sional arrest warrants to issue on information and belief, and, more
broadly, with the traditional view that fugitives in extradition cases have
limited recourse to constitutional procedural protections."
95. Id.
96. See Magisano v. Locke, 545 F.2d 1228, 1230 (9th Cir. 1976).
97. Id.
98. See Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 748 (2d. Cir. 1980); In re Extradition of
Russell, 805 F2d 1215, 1217 (5th Cir. 1986); Sahagian v. United States, 864 F2d 509, 512-
13 (7th Cir. 1988). See also United States v. Williams, 480 F. Supp. 482, 485 (D. Mass.
1979) (expressing doubt as to the-constitutionality of a thirty-day provisional detention based
solely on information that the fugitive had been charged with an extraditable crime), rev'd on
other grounds, 611 F2d 914 (1st Cir. 1979); Spatola v. United States, 741 F Supp. 362, 366
(E.D.N.Y.1990) (magistrate avoided the constitutional question raised by fugitive's Fourth
Amendment challenge to the provisional arrest warrant by finding that probable cause had
been established).
Some academicians and legal commentators have criticized the practice of obtaining
provisional warrants without a prior evidentiary showing of probable cause to believe the
fugitive committed the crime charged abroad. See, BASSIOUNI, supra note 2, at 527-28; see
also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Extradition Reform Legislation in the United States: 1981-1983,
17 AKRON L. REv. 495, 522-25 (1984); Note, Probable Cause and Provisional Arrest Under
Certain Extradition Treaties: Caltagirone v. Grant, 7 N.C. 1. INTL. L. & COM. REG. 121
(1982); Kester, supra note 3, at 1464-65.
99. See, e.g., In re Extradition of Burt, 737 F.2d 1477 (7th Cir. 1984). The Burt case of-
fers an excellent example of one court's willingness to reject traditional impediments to
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Before Parretti, in Caltagirone v. Grant,'°° the Second Circuit came
closer than any court had previously come to addressing the constitu-
tional issue. The court raised "grave questions concerning the
constitutional propriety" of issuing an arrest warrant solely on the basis
of the government's assurance of the existence of a foreign arrest war-
rant.1O' The court avoided the constitutional question by interpreting an
constitutional scrutiny of the conduct of the executive branch in extradition cases. In his
appeal from a denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief, Burt invoked the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to argue that the government's delay in deciding to extradite
him to Germany violated his due process right to be free from unjustified prosecutorial delay,
especially because the government had made an earlier, tentative decision not to extradite
him. The government responded that the district court should not even have considered
Burt's due.process argument because it was beyond the traditional scope of habeas review in
extradition cases. Specifically, the government argued that the court was constrained by Fer-
nandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311 (1925), to consider only certain questions in a habeas
challenge to an extradition order. In the oft-cited Fernandez opinion, Justice Holmes had
written: "[Habeas Corpus] is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdic-
tion, whether the offence [sic] charged is within the treaty and, by somewhat liberal
extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable
ground to believe the accused guilty." Id. at 312.
The Burt panel acknowledged that under Fernandez the scope of habeas review in extra-
dition cases had been limited, but it then distinguished between traditional habeas challenges
to the findings of the magistrate and constitutional challenges to the conduct of the executive
branch in deciding to extradite the accused.
We hold that federal courts undertaking habeas corpus review of extraditions have
the authority to consider not only procedural defects in the extradition procedures
that are of constitutional dimension, but also the substantive conduct of the United
States in undertaking its decision to extradite if such conduct violates constitu-
tional rights. Such a view recognizes ... that the broad language of Fernandez,
which on its face would appear to restrict the scope of inquiry here, must be con-
strued in the context of its time and the context of subsequent development of the
scope of habeas corpus review.
Burt, 737 F.2d at 1484.
The Burt panel relied heavily on an earlier Fourth Circuit decision in Plaster v. United
States, 720 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1983), in which the court similarly expanded the traditional
scope of habeas review of an extradition order:
It is critical to note ... that neither Fernandez v. Phillips nor the cases that have
followed it have considered the scope of habeas corpus in connection with a claim
that the actions of the United States government in extraditing the petitioner would
violate his constitutional rights. It is well settled ... that the United States gov-
ernment must, in carrying out its treaty obligations, conform its conduct to the
requirements of the Constitution, and that treaty obligations cannot justify other-
wise unconstitutional government conduct.
Id. at 348-49 [citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1957) (plurality opinion), and Ro-
sado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1195-96 (2d Cir. 1980) (citations omitted)].
The panel in Burt also found some authority for the suggestion that the limited scope of
review applies only to the extradition ruling and not to procedural issues, Garcia-Guillern v.
United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1191 (5th Cir. 1971); David v. Attorney General, 699 F.2d 411
(7th Cir. 1983).
100. Caltagirone, 629 F.2d at 748.
101. Id.
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extradition treaty between the United States and Italy to require a full
evidentiary showing of probable cause to believe that a crime had been
committed, and then holding that the provisional arrest warrant, which
had issued solely on the basis of the existence of an Italian arrest war-
rant, violated the treaty because it was issued without probable cause.'O°
The relevant language in the U.S.-Italian treaty read:
In case of urgency a Contracting Party may apply for the provi-
sional arrest of the person sought pending the presentation of
the request for extradition through the diplomatic channel ....
The application shall contain a description of the person sought,
an indication of intention to request the extradition of the person
sought and a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest...
against that person, and such further information, if any, as
would be necessary to justify the issue of a warrant of arrest had
the offense been committed... in the territory of the requested
Party.
0 3
The Italian treaty provided for the issuance of a provisional arrest
warrant in the United States upon a showing that an Italian arrest war-
rant had been issued and upon "such further information as would be
necessary to justify the issue of the warrant of arrest had the offense
been committed" in the United States) °( The Caltagirone panel read the
"further information" provision of the treaty to require a showing of
probable cause prior to the issuance of a warrant."°
Likewise, in Sahagian v. United States,'' the Seventh Circuit
avoided the constitutional question by reading the "further information"
language of the treaty between the United States and Spain as requiring
a showing of probable cause. The treaty provided:
In case of urgency a Contracting Party may apply to the other
Contracting Party for the provisional arrest of the person
sought... The application shall contain a description of the
person sought, an indication of intention to request the extradi-
tion of the person sought and a statement of the existence of a
102. Id. at 747 ("The overwhelming evidence that Article XIII [of the treaty] itself pro-
hibits provisional arrest without probable cause relieves us of the need to examine the
constitutional propriety of a treaty that purports to permit such arrests.").
103. Id. at 744 n.9 (quoting Treaty of Extradition, Jan. 18, 1973, U.S.-Italy, art. XIII, 26
U.S.T. 493).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 744 ("Had the offense... been committed in the United States, a showing of
probable cause would have been necessary to justify the issuance of an arrest warrant.").
106. Sahagian v. United States, 864 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1988).
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warrant of arrest... and such further information, if any, as
may be required by the requested Party. °
The Seventh Circuit read the "further information" language of the
treaty to require a showing of probable cause as a predicate to the issu-
ance of a provisional arrest warrant, thereby skirting the Fourth
Amendment question.' °8 However, unlike the court in Caltagirone,
which dealt with the arrest of a foreign national by U.S. authorities, the
Sahagian court was called upon to determine the legality of a foreign
arrest of a U.S. citizen. The court found that his provisional arrest
abroad had been supported by probable cause because the arrest had
been based on a complaint and warrant issued in the United States."
A Fifth Circuit decision similarly avoided the Fourth Amendment
issue by finding that a showing of probable cause had in fact been
made."° As the court in Russell stated: "Assuming without deciding that
the Treaty requires a showing of probable cause to support a provisional
arrest ... we agree with the district court that the magistrate had enough
evidence before him to show probable cause to detain [the fugitive].''
In sum, in order for the constitutional question to be decided
squarely, a case had to arise in which, first, the relevant extradition
treaty could not be construed as requiring a showing of probable cause
as a predicate for a provisional arrest warrant, and in which, second, the
issuing magistrate issued a warrant based solely on the requesting
country's allegations and not on actual evidence. That case would finally
come in Parretti v. United States. When it came, however, Parretti
would raise not only the constitutionality of the government's proce-
dures for obtaining provisional arrest warrants, but also the
constitutionality of the traditional presumption that the fugitive, once
arrested, should be denied release on bail.
107. Id. at 511. See also Parretti v. United States, 112 F.3d 1363, 1373 (9th Cir. 1997)
(discussing Sahagian, 864 F.2d at 509).
108. Sahagian, 864 F.2d at 513 ("As contemplated by Article XI [of the Spanish treaty],
the federal officials obtained Sahagian's provisional arrest and detention pending extradition
after obtaining an arrest warrant from a magistrate based upon a showing of probable
cause:').
109. Id.
110. In re Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1217 (5th Cir. 1986).
111. Id. at 1217. See also Spatola v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y.
1990) (noting that magistrate had avoided the constitutional question raised by defendant's
Fourth Amendment challenge to the warrant for his provisional arrest by finding probable
cause).
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II. IN THE MATIER OF THE EXTRADITION OF GIANCARLO PARRElTi
On May 6, 1997, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Giancarlo Parretti's arrest vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment because the provisional arrest warrant
issued by a United States Magistrate Judge had not been supported by
an evidentiary showing sufficient, under standards applicable to domes-
tic warrants, to establish probable cause to believe that Parretti had
committed the offenses charged against him in France, the requesting
country."2 The court also held that Parretti's detention following his
provisional arrest violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment absent a showing that he posed a risk of flight, notwithstanding the
government's interest in enforcement of extradition treaties."' In so
ruling, the court deemed both the extradition treaty with France and the
relevant portions of the federal extradition statute unconstitutional.
4
A. The Procedural Background to the Parretti Decision
In 1990, a corporation headed by Giancarlo Parretti, an Italian citi-
zen and resident, bought MGM-United Artists (MGM-UA) for $1.3
billion, in a transaction that was widely reported in the media."' The
transaction, which was highly leveraged, gave rise to MGM-Pathe
Communications Corporation, and spawned a number of lawsuits."6
112. Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1363. Judge Pregerson, Circuit Judge, filed a dissent ex-
pressing the view that the court should have dismissed Parretti's appeal under the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine, which allows the court the discretion to dismiss an appeal by an
appellant who becomes a fugitive while his appeal is pending. Id. at 1390-91. In 1996, while
his appeal was still pending in the Ninth Circuit, Giancarlo Parretti fled the United States. Id.
at 1390. When a criminal defendant becomes a fugitive from justice, courts have discretion
to dismiss the defendant's appeal because his absence "disentitles the defendant to call upon
the resources of the Court for determination of his claims." Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S.
365, 366 (1970) (per curiam). Citing this doctrine, Judge Pregerson wrote that Parretti's
appeal should be dismissed. Id. at 1390-91. In deciding not to dismiss the appeal, the major-
ity answered:
First, Parretti is not seeking further relief from this court .... We are simply issu-
ing an opinion explaining our earlier action, as we promised to do in the order we
issued prior to his flight. We believe that the government and the district court,
among others, are entitled to that explanation.
Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1380 n.21.
113. Id. at 1384.
114. Id. at 1377-78.
115. Parretti himself was by then a well-known figure in the world of international
business, and he has continued to draw widespread media attention. See, e.g., Peter Truell,
Authorities Can Track Fugitive Financiers, But They Can't Bring Them in, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 1997, Section D, at 1; Reuters, Extradition Ordered for Italian Financier, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 1996, at 43.
116. Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1365.
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On May 3, 1995, a French magistrate issued a warrant for Parretti's
arrest, charging"7 Parretti with misappropriation of company assets, for-
gery, fraud, and making false statements in judicial proceedings in
France, in connection with litigation over the MGM-UA deal."' At the
time the warrant issued and for the ensuing five months Parretti was in
his native country of Italy, where, he would later maintain, the French
authorities could have sought his arrest and extradition." 9 France did not
seek his arrest and extradition while he was in Italy.'20
On October 9, 1995, Parretti entered the United States to appear in
Delaware Superior Court, where he was under indictment for perjury
and evidence tampering in a suit relating to the MGM-UA purchase, and
from there to travel to California to attend a deposition also concerning
the MGM-UA deal.2 ' On October 10, French authorities forwarded a
diplomatic note to the State Department requesting Parretti's provisional
arrest pursuant to article IV of the Treaty of Extradition between the
United States and France,'2 so that he could be held pending a formal
request for his extradition.2 2 The government filed a "Complaint for
Provisional Arrest Warrant," to which an AUSA for the Central District
of California, "acting on behalf of the Government of France, swore on
information and belief."'24 The Complaint summarized the allegations in
the French arrest warrant, namely, that Parretti had looted the French
company Europe Image Distribution, one of MGM-Pathe's subsidiaries,
and that he had forged documents and made false statements.'2 The
117. In France, the arrest warrant served as the charging document. Id. at 1363.
118. Id. at 1365.
119. Id. at 1367.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1365.
122. Treaty of Extradition between the United States and France, January 6, 1909, as
amended, Feb. 12, 1970, U.S.-Fr., 22 U.S.T. 407, T.I.A.S. 7075.
123. At the time French authorities sought Parretti's provisional arrest and even at the
time of his arrest in the United States, France had not yet made a formal request for his ex-
tradition. Article IV of the U.S.A. France Extradition Treaty provided for the person
provisionally arrested to be held for up to forty days pending a request for extradition. Id. art
IV. The Parretti panel interpreted article IV to authorize an arrest and detention without a
firm commitment from France that it would even decide to seek extradition at the end of the
forty-day period: "Article IV provides for the ... person 'provisionally arrested' to be held
for up to 40 days pending a possible request that the fugitive be extradited." Parretti, 112
F.3d at 1365 (emphasis added). However, the reality appears to have been that France fully
intended to seek Parretti's extradition when it decided to ask U.S. authorities to arrest him
pursuant to the extradition treaty. In the Complaint filed by the government with its applica-
tion to the court for a provisional arrest warrant, the AUSA stated: "I am informed through
diplomatic channels that the Requesting State will make a regular diplomatic request for the
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French warrant was not attached to the Complaint, nor were any affida-
vits or other documentary evidence. 6 As the Parretti court later
observed: "The sole basis for the allegations of wrongdoing made in the
AUSA's Complaint is the French Arrest Warrant. In other words, the
AUSA simply alleges on information and belief that the French arrest
warrant contains various allegations of wrongdoing by Parretti"' 7
On the basis of the Complaint, United States Magistrate Judge Jo-
seph Reichmann issued a provisional arrest warrant, and Parretti was
arrested by federal agents while being deposed at the Los Angeles of-
fices of the White & Case law firm on October 18, 1995.'8
At a detention hearing two days later, Parretti argued that his arrest
had violated the Fourth Amendment because the provisional arrest war-
rant had not been supported by competent evidence establishing
probable cause.'9 He also moved for release on bail, arguing that he
posed no risk of flight or danger to the community, and that "special
circumstances" existed justifying his release.30 The circumstances
which he alleged to be 'special' were, in combination, that: a French
bank, Credit Lyonnais, with which he was involved in litigation, was
misusing the extradition process to obtain an advantage in its litigation
with him; his continued detention could pose a significant risk to his
health; he was elsewhere embroiled in civil litigation which would af-
fect his interests and which would require his participation; the offenses
charged in France would likely be ruled non-extraditable offenses under
the treaty; and, he was facing criminal charges in Italy, for which an
Italian court had also requested his return to that country, and that the
Italian request might have priority over the French request.'
At a supplemental detention hearing ten days later, Parretti did not
re-argue some of his earlier reasons supporting bail, including: that the
extradition process was being misused on behalf of Credit Lyonnais;
that the health concerns; and that he needed to participate in civil litiga-
tion elsewhere. Instead, he now asserted that: (1) there would be a delay
in the extradition matter because the State of Delaware was likely to
request that the extradition be deferred until he could be tried on crimi-
nal charges there; (2) Italy was entitled to his return before France (even
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Government's Response to Petition for Habeas Corpus Seeking Review of Magis-
trate Judge's Order Holding Petitioner with No Bail Pending Extradition to France at 14
[hereinafter Government's Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus], Parretti v.
United States, No. CV95-7593-JMI (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 8, 1995).
129. Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1365.
130. Id.
131. Unofficial transcript of detention hearing, Oct. 20, 1995 (on file with author).
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though Italy had not yet made a proper extradition request through the
diplomatic channel); (3) France's extradition request would likely be
defeated because the French charges did not have U.S. counterparts as
required by the U.S.-France extradition treaty, and (4) his provisional
arrest violated the Fourth Amendment because the complaint had failed
to establish probable cause.'32
The government disputed that any of these circumstances was
"special," and argued in addition that Parretti was a flight risk.' On the
issue of probable cause, the government answered that the issuing mag-
istrate had made a probable cause determination, which had in turn been
"supported by specific facts that are set forth in the Complaint, relaying
facts that were conveyed to the U.S. by France," albeit "in an informal
way" and not "in a way of formal evidence.'' "[N]othing," said the
AUSA, "prohibits that.' 35
Magistrate Judge Reichmann rejected Parretti's Fourth Amendment
argument, stating that the government's recital of the allegations of the
French warrant was "sufficient at this stage"' 36 and ordered Parretti de-
tained pending the extradition proceedings. Magistrate Judge Reichmann
did not find that Parretti was a flight risk, but found that Parretti had
failed to demonstrate any "special circumstances" overcoming the pre-
sumption against bail.'3
Parretti filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the district
court, arguing that the provisional arrest warrant had violated the Fourth
Amendment's Warrant Clause because it had been issued without a prior
showing of competent evidence supporting probable cause to believe
that he had committed any of the offenses charged in France.'38 Relying
on Caltagirone v. Grant,'39 he argued that the Complaint had not pur-
ported to establish-and the Magistrate had not purported to find-
probable cause.' 4° Parretti also argued that Magistrate Judge Reichmann
had not only failed to make a probable cause determination, but had ef-
fectively declared at the detention hearing that such a determination was
not necessary by stating that the government's recital of the allegations
in the French warrant was "sufficient at this stage.'
4
'
132. Government's Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 15-18, Parretti
(No. CV95-7593-JMI) (statement of facts summarizing earlier bail hearings).
133. Id. at 21.
134. Id. at 47.
135. Id.
136. Parretti, 112 F3d at 1366 (citation omitted).
137. Unofficial transcript of detention hearing, Oct. 20, 1995 (on file with author).
138. Parretti, 112 F3d at 1365-1366 (citation omitted).
139. Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F2d 739, 744-48 (2d Cir. 1980).
140. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 13, Parretti (No. CV95-7593-JMI).
141. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 23, Parretti (No. CV95-7593-JMI).
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In his habeas petition, Parretti also renewed his bail application.'42
He took issue with the notion that even where a person demonstrates
that he is not a flight risk, he is not entitled to bail unless he can also
show special circumstances. 3 "For the government to restrain a per-
son's liberty there must be a compelling state interest," he began.'"
While "the government does have an interest in making sure it can ful-
fill its obligation to surrender the person if extradition is determined to
be appropriate," that interest "can be protected adequately by making
bail available to those persons who do not pose a risk of flight"'4 5
Accordingly, the Court should rule that the Due Process interest
in personal liberty requires that a person arrested pursuant to a
provisional arrest warrant may be detained and denied bail only
on grounds that there are no conditions short of detention that
will reasonably assure his or her appearance at the extradition
hearing."'"
As proof that he was not a risk of flight, Parretti offered his record
of making his court appearances in the various lawsuits and criminal
proceedings against him in the United States and abroad.'47
As a fallback, Parretti argued that even if the court were to reject his
due process argument that the special circumstances test is unconstitu-
tional, there were four special circumstances justifying his release on
bail. This time, he offered a reformulated combination of some of the
circumstances he had put forward at the two bail hearings: (1) probable
success in defeating the French extradition request on the merits after
the extradition hearing;'"' (2) his need to participate in other civil
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 22 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)).
145. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 23-24 (CV95-7593-JMI), Parretti (No. 95-
3133M).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 24-26.
148. Parretti v. United States, 112 F.3d 1363, 1367 (9th Cir. 1997) (Parretti citing
Salerno v. United States, 878 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1989), for support on this point).
In his habeas petition, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 19, Parretti (No. CV95-
7593-JMI), Parretti pressed upon the court a third reason for ruling that his detention was
unconstitutional, namely, that the extradition statutory scheme of 18 U.S.C. § 3184 violated
the separation of powers doctrine because it conferred upon the Secretary of State the
authority to review the legal determinations of federal courts in extradition cases without
being bound by them, insofar as the statute left open the possibility that the Secretary might
decline to surrender to a requesting country a fugitive whom the courts had certified as ex-
traditable. The argument was based on a decision earlier that year in Lobue v. Christopher,
893 F Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 82 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir.
1996), in which the district court held that the extradition statute was unconstitutional on
separation of powers grounds because it allowed the Secretary of State, a member of the
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litigation during the period pending his extradition proceedings;' 49 (3)
his deteriorating medical condition (high blood pressure, kidney stones,
and a urinary tract infection); 50 and (4) the failure of the French
authorities earlier in the year to make an effort to extradite him from
Italy during the five months after the issuance of the French warrant-a
failure which, he claimed, showed that France did not really need for
him to be held for the forty-day period allowed by the treaty for the
preparation of the formal extradition request. 5'
In its response, the government answered Parretti's bail argument
first, with the premise that "'[there is a presumption against bail in an
extradition case.'" 52 Then, citing Russell,'53 the government argued that
in the face of the presumption against bail, to justify his release Parretti
was required to demonstrate both the absence of flight risk and the pres-
ence of special circumstances.'-" "Thus, even if Parretti were able to
show that he is not a flight risk, only 'special circumstances' would jus-
tify the granting of bail," and, "the burden of showing such 'special
circumstances' is placed on the extraditee" and "remains on the extra-
ditee even if he demonstrates that he is not a flight risk."'55 On risk of
flight, the government stressed that Parretti had the resources and means
to flee; he had only marginal ties 'to the United States; he was being in-
vestigated by federal authorities in California for racketeering, fraud,
tax fraud, and money laundering, and would have no incentive but to
flee once federal charges became imminent; he had a history of failing
to appear for legal proceedings, namely, a prior failure to show up for an
Immigration and Naturalization Service hearing in Los Angeles five
years earlier; and he had a record of deceit (a Delaware civil court had
found that he lied in testimony before that court).'56
executive branch, to review and even take no action on an order by a federal court certifying
a fugitive as extraditable. In the interim, a number of courts have declined to follow Lobue.
Parretti's Lobue argument appears to have been somewhat of a 'kitchen sink' argument made
on the offhand chance that the court might follow Lobue despite the fact that other courts
were resoundingly declining to do so.
The panel in Parreni never reached his Lobue argument, having found and ruled for Par-
retti on other constitutional grounds. Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1377 n.18. Accordingly, any
further discussion of Lobue is beyond the scope of this article.
149. See Parretti, 112 F. 3d at 1367 (Parretti cited United States v. Williams, 611 F.2d
914, 915 (1st Cir. 1979) on this point).
150. Parretti cited Salerno on this point. Id.
151. Id.
152. Government's Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 18, Parretti (No.
CV95-7593-JMI) (quoting from Salerno v. United States, 878 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1989)).
153. In re Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1217 (5th Cir. 1986).
154. Government's Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 20, Parretti (No.
CV95-7593-JMI).
155. Id. (citing Salerno, at 317-318).
156. Id. at 21-24.
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The government then argued that even if Parretti could establish that
he did not present a risk of flight, requiring him nevertheless to establish
special circumstances would not violate the Due Process Clause. 57 Cit-
ing Wright v. Henkel,' the government stated that Parretti's position on
the bail issue "is contrary to both Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit
precedent" and "would do away with the 'special circumstances' re-
quirement in all cases."'59 The government then rebutted each of
Parretti's four claimed special circumstances: the French charges were
likely to be ruled extraditable by the magistrate; Parretti's need to par-
ticipate in civil litigation during the pendency of his extradition
proceedings could be accommodated if necessary; France's failure to
request his extradition from Italy when it could have done so months
before his entry into the United States was not a special circumstance,
especially in view of Italy's freedom (and its tendency) to refuse to ex-
tradite its own citizens to other countries; and, the Bureau of Prisons
could provide appropriate medical care for his ailments. W
On the question of probable cause for the issuance of the provi-
sional arrest warrant, the government responded that both the
extradition treaty with France and the extradition statute "must be prop-
erly interpreted to require a showing of probable cause and thus to
comply with any Fourth Amendment requirement."'' The government
cited the rule that treaties and statutes should be interpreted to comply
with constitutional requirements whenever possible.'62 "Applying the
presumption that Treaties and statutes should be interpreted whenever
possible in such a way as to render them constitutional, such an inter-
pretation is proper and ensures compliance with any applicable probable
cause requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment."'63 The question
remained, however, whether the treaty and statute required a showing of
probable cause to believe that the fugitive committed the crime charged,
or probable cause to believe, simply, that he was duly charged by the
requesting country with an extraditable crime. The government's answer
'was that 'probable cause' in support of a provisional arrest warrant in an
157. Id at 25.
158. Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 62-63 (1903).
159. Government's Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 25, Parretti (No.
CV95-7593-JMI) (citing Wright, 190 U.S. at 62-63; Salerno, 878 F.2d at 317).
160. Id. at 21-28.
161. Id. at 34.
162. Id. at 43-44 (citing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128-30 (1958)) (interpreting
treaty, court applies historic mandate to construe ambiguous enactments in a manner that
comports with the Constitution).
163. Id. at 34.
[Vol. 19:729
Extradition Law at the Crossroads
extradition case should be something less than probable cause in support
of a domestic arrest warrant in a criminal case.'"
It remains an open issue what type of probable cause must be
shown by a complaint seeking provisional arrest. Extradition
proceedings do not result in a United States determination as to
guilt or innocence; rather, the final determination made by a
United States court is one of probable cause to believe the for-
eign offenses charged were in fact committed by the person
whose extradition is sought. Arguably, the probable cause
showing required for provisional arrest should be something
less. To hold otherwise would mean that the complete extradi-
tion showing would be required at the preliminary stage of the
provisional arrest, a practical impossibility in many cases in
which the arrest must be arranged with haste to avoid further
flight. Accordingly, to justify provisional arrest, the government
submits that all that must be shown is probable cause to believe
either that the individual is duly charged in the foreign country,
or, alternatively, that the extradition request itself will be suc-
cessful, that is, probable cause to believe it, likely that the
government will be able to establish the prerequisites for extra-
dition.6
Since probable cause to believe that the fugitive committed the
crime charged is the standard used at the formal extradition hearing to
determine whether a person should be extradited, the government ar-
gued, that same standard should not be used to determine whether the
fugitive should be arrested and held while awaiting the formal extradi-
tion request, especially where a showing of probable cause would be a
"practical impossibility in many cases in which the arrest must be ar-
ranged with haste to avoid further flight.'"
Perhaps to be safe, however, the government immediately assured
the court that it need not resolve whether a provisional arrest warrant
could issue without an evidentiary showing of probable cause to believe
the fugitive committed the crime charged abroad, "because the com-
plaint in this case established probable cause to believe that Parretti
committed the offenses with which he is charged in France.""
Contrary to Parretti's claims, the complaint does far more than
simply set out the existence of a French warrant charging
164. Id. at 36 n.10.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 37.
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Parretti. The complaint describes in detail both the nature of the
offenses charged and the specific facts relied upon by the
French warrant to support those charges ... [T]his recitation of
facts is sufficient to establish probable cause to believe both that
Parretti has committed the French offenses with which he is
charged and that those acts are extraditable. Though this
recitation of the facts is based on information and belief
communicated through the warrant itself, such a recitation is
sufficient for a finding of probable cause.
The government rejected Parretti's claim that Magistrate Judge
Reichmann had not made a judicial finding of probable cause, and the
government answered that Judge Reichmann had indeed concluded that
the complaint provided sufficient facts to establish probable cause.169
The district court denied Parretti's habeas petition, ruling that the
provisional arrest had been lawful because the Complaint for Pro-
visional Arrest Warrant "alleges more than sufficient facts, with more
than sufficient particularity, to establish probable cause to believe that
Parretti committed the offenses with which he is charged in France.' 7
The district court rejected the view that the government was required to
make an evidentiary showing up front, as a predicate for the issuance of
a warrant, saying that an evidentiary showing could wait until the
168. Id. at 46-47. In support, the government cited In re Extradition of Russell, 805
F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1986), in which the detainee, like Parretti, had challenged his arrest on
Fourth Amendment grounds for lack of a showing of probable cause. In finding that the
magistrate judge had enough evidence before him to show probable cause, the court in Rus-
sell adopted the view that "the evidence at the provisional arrest stage [can] be informal:'
and noted further that "several cases have approved the use of a complaint based on infor-
mation and belief rather than personal knowledge:' Id. at 1217 (citing Yordi v. Nolte, 215
U.S. 227, 232 (1909); Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 193 (1902)). In Russell, however, unlike
in Parretti, the magistrate had before him copies of a number of letters and other documents
which made out a case against Russell, and not just a foreign warrant or complaint.
What of the two Supreme Court cases cited in Russell? In Yordi, as discussed earlier in
Part I.A., supra, while the syllabus of the case in the U.S. Reports suggested that an arrest
warrant could issue without an evidentiary foundation, as long as the complaint so clearly
and explicitly stated a crime covered by the relevant extradition treaty that the accused could
understand the charge, in fact, the Yordi Court found that the warrant in that case had been
supported by an evidentiary showing (depositions). Yordi, 215 U.S. at 230.
In Grin, the Court suggested that the complaint had to be based on the oath of someone
who had actual knowledge of the facts, or, absent such a person, by an official who could at
least base his complaint upon depositions. Grin, 187 U.S. at 193.
169. Government's Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 47-48, Parretti
(No. CV95-7593-JMI).
170. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Application for Bail and
Habeas Corpus Petition, filed Nov. 15, 1995, at 5-6; Excerpt of Record at 5-6, Parretti (No.
CV95-7593-JMI).
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expiration of the forty-day period which the treaty allowed France for
the transmittal of the formal extradition documents.'
The district court found that Parretti was not a flight risk but never-
theless denied his bail request.' Stating the rule that bail in extradition
cases is "only granted in exceptional circumstances,"'" the court found
that Parretti had not established any of the first three special circum-
stances which he had claimed, and found that the fourth circumstance-
that France had not requested his extradition from Italy-was not a spe-
cial circumstance as a matter of law." Specifically, the district court
found that Parretti was likely to be found extraditable after an extradi-
tion hearing; his detention would not interfere with his participation in
the civil suits against him; he was receiving sufficient medical attention
in jail; and France's earlier failure to extradite him from Italy was not a
special circumstance as a matter of law.'75
Shortly thereafter, Parretti filed a motion in the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit seeking emergency review of the district
court's order, renewing his arguments on both the legality of the provi-
sional warrant and the refusal of bail.' On November 21, 1995, a
motions panel granted Parretti's motion and ordered his immediate re-
lease on two independent grounds: first, that his arrest violated the
Fourth Amendment because the government had failed to make the nec-
essary evidentiary showing, of probable cause to believe Parretti had
committed an extraditable offense; and second, that his detention vio-
lated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in light of the
district court's finding that he was not a flight risk.' The order of the
motions panel was unpublished, but the panel retained jurisdiction and
indicated that an opinion might follow.7s
171. Excerpt of Record at 150-51, Parretti (No. CV95-7593-JMI). Reporter's Tran-
script of Proceedings at 7-8, Parretti (No. CV95-7593-JMI). At oral argument on the habeas
petition, counsel for Parretti argued that "all that [the Government is] doing is regurgitating
to the court what they have obtained from the warrant from France. We don't know what the
investigating magistrate based those statements on." Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1366. The district
judge, James M. Ideman, responded: "That's what they got [sic] 40 days to clear up and to
make a presentation in their extradition proceedings." Id.
172. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings (Nov. 9, 1995) (on file with the author).
173. Excerpt of Record at 148, Parretti, (No. CV95-7593-JMI).
174. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, & Order Denying Application for Bail and
Habeas Corpus Pet.; see also Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1367.
175. Parretti, 112 F3d at 1367.
176. At the time he filed the emergency motion, Parretti also filed notice of appeal. The
appeal and the motion proceedings were consolidated later under Ninth Circuit cause number
95-56586. See also Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1368 n.5.
177. Id. at 1368 (citing United States v. Parretti (No. 95-56586) (9th Cir. Nov. 21, 1995)
(order granting release from custody)).
178. Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1367-68 n.7.
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After the unpublished order issued, the government filed a petition
for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc. The government
now raised a new argument on the issue of probable cause, arguing that
the Secretary of State's decision to enforce an extradition treaty author-
izing provisional arrest upon information of a foreign warrant reflects
the Secretary's determination that the foreign nation's charging proce-
dures are sufficiently reliable to justify according the foreign
government full faith and credit sufficient to satisfy the probable cause
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The government argued that
under the doctrine of judicial non-inquiry, the federal courts must defer
to the Secretary's decision and accept at face value the foreign warrant
as a basis for issuing a warrant for provisional arrest.' 9
Under the rule of non-inquiry, courts in extradition cases have gen-
erally declined to inquire into non-justiciable matters such as the
requesting country's motive for seeking the fugitive's extradition, or the
procedures or treatment which await a surrendered fugitive in the re-
questing country.'O In making the argument based on this rule, the
government echoed the broader separation of powers argument it has
often made in other cases where its foreign policy interests are involved.
The government has often argued that courts should defer to the execu-
tive branch where foreign affairs and political questions are
implicated.'
The government offered yet another argument in the petition for re-
hearing, this one on the form of evidence on which any finding of
probable cause should be based. Specifically, the government argued
that the French magistrate's "determinations of fact" should be consid-
ered sufficient because a provisional arrest warrant "may be based on
facts reported on information and belief without supporting affidavits,
deposition testimony, or other competent evidence."' 2 The Government
relied on Yordi v. Nolte, where the Court had rejected the argument that
an extradition complaint must be sworn to by persons having actual
179. Id. at 1368.
180. See, e.g., Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911) ("We are bound by the
existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair.").
181. [See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (deferring to the
executive branch where conduct of foreign policy is implicated); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,
292 (1981) (noting that "matters intimately related to foreign policy are rarely proper sub-
jects for judicial intervention."). For a comprehensive discussion of this tradition of
deference, see Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTIUTION (1972); HAROLD
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURrrY CONSTITUTION (1990); and THOMAS M. FRANCK,
POLITICAL QUESTIONSIJUDICIAL ANSWERS (1992).]
182. Government's Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 9,
Parretti (No. 95-56586).
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knowledge of the facts alleged.' The government relied further on In re
Extradition of Russell'" and Grin v. Shine,"' both of which, it claimed,
supported the view that a complaint could be based on information and
belief rather than on sworn personal knowledge."6 The petition was de-
nied "without prejudice," "subject to renewal" if and when the panel
published its order or issued a written opinion."'
In the meantime, the extradition matter went forward. Eight days
after Parretti was ordered released by the Ninth Circuit, the government
filed France's formal request for Parretti's extradition with the Magis-
trate Judge, including a voluminous package of authenticated and
certified affidavits and other documentary evidence."' During the next
five months, Parretti and the government studied the extradition package
and filed briefs on whether the extradition documents satisfied the for-
mal and substantive requisites for an order of extraditability. 9 On May
10, 1996, the formal extradition hearing was held before the Magistrate
Judge.'9 Parretti appeared.' On May 31, 1996, the Magistrate Judge
found Parretti extraditable on all charges alleged in the French warrant,
and entered an order certifying to the Secretary of State that Parretti was
extraditable.' With the consent of the government, the Magistrate
Judge continued Parretti's release on bail pending the filing of a petition
for writ of habeas corpus.'9' On July 1, 1996, Parretti filed a habeas pe-
tition in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California,
collaterally attacking the order certifying his extraditability.' 4 In De-
cember of 1996, while his habeas petition was pending, Parretti fled the
country.'" On March 12, 1997, the district court dismissed his habeas
petition with prejudice under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.J
On May 6, 1997, the Ninth Circuit issued a published opinion ex-
plaining and expanding on its November 21, 1995 order releasing
183. Yordi v. Nolte, 215 U.S. 227 (1909).
184. In re Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1986).
185. Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181 (1902).
186. See the discussion of these cases in Part I, supra note 10.
187. Order Denying Rehearing With Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, Parreti (No.
95-56586) (9th Cir. filed Jan. 10, 1996); see also Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1367 n.7.





193. Id. (Order staying surrender of Parretti). The petition for writ of habeas corpus is
the mechanism by which the accused can collaterally attack an order certifying his extradit-
ability. See 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994). See also Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, (1925).
194. In re Extradition of Parretti (No. 96-4572-ghksh) (C.D. Cal. Filed July 1, 1996).
195. Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1380 n.21.
196. Id. at 1368 n.6. On the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, supra note 112.
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Parretti.' 97 On June 19, 1997, the government filed its Petition for Re-
hearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc.'98 On October 2, 1997,
that petition was granted.'" The en banc hearing took place December
18, 1997, and the matter was still pending at the time this article went to
press.'
B. The Parretti Decision
1. The Requisite Probable Cause Showing
Before turning to the merits of the government's argument, the
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that this argument raised a constitutional
question of "first impression."' ' The panel looked to cases from the
Second, Seventh, and Fifth Circuits 202 and found that those courts had
avoided answering the constitutional question by interpreting the
197. Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1363.
198. Government's Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 9,
filed June 19, 1997, Parretti (No. 95-56586).
199. Order Granting Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Parretti (No. 95-56586) (9th Cir.
filed Oct. 2, 1997).
200. See Government's Petition for Rehearing En Banc, filed June 19, 1997, Parretti,
(No. 95-56586) and Order Granting Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Parretti (No. 95-56586)
(9th Cir. filed Oct. 2, 1997); Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1363 (reheard en banc on Dec. 18, 1997).
201. Parretti, 112 F3d at 1372. As a predicate matter, the panel rejected the govern-
ment's argument that the court was barred by the rule of judicial non-inquiry from making an
independent evaluation of the sufficiency of the foreign government's charging procedures.
The panel observed that the rule of judicial non-inquiry was meant to prevent the courts from
endeavoring to decide such non-justiciable questions as the general fairness of a foreign
country's legal and penal systems, or the motive of the requesting country in seeking extra-
dition. "The rule of judicial non-inquiry was not designed to relieve the federal courts of our
'unflagging obligation' to decide actual cases or controversies that come before us." Id. at
1369-70 (citation omitted). The court stressed that an inquiry into whether the foreign
charge was sufficiently supported by evidence establishing probable cause was a fully justi-
ciable one. "[T]he government invites us to extend the rule of judicial non-inquiry to the
paradigmatic justiciable question whether an arrest warrant has been issued in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. We respectfully decline the government's invitation." Id. at 1369. To
hold otherwise, the panel noted, would amount to giving full faith and credit to a foreign
charging document and to "clothe foreign arrest warrants with a presumption of compliance
with the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1371.
It strikes us as curious that the government asks us to give full faith and credit to a
foreign charging document at the provisional arrest stage even though we do not
give it full faith and credit for probable cause purposes at the extradition hearing
stage .... Just as we do not accept the foreign charging document as a substitute
for the customary showing of probable cause at the extradition hearing, we see no
reason to accept it as a substitute for a judicial determination of probable cause at
the provisional arrest stage.
Id.
202. See Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F2d 739 (2nd Cir. 1980); Sahagian v. United States,
864 F2d 509 (7th Cir. 1988); In re Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1986).
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relevant treaties in those cases to require an evidentiary showing of
probable cause before the issuance of a provisional arrest warrant."'
However, neither the article [of the French treaty] authorizing
provisional arrests, nor any other provision of the French treaty
can fairly be so interpreted .... [I]n stark contrast to the treaties
with Italy [Caltagirone] and Spain [Sahagian], ... the treaty
with France contains no 'further information' requirement, nor
any other language that might fairly be interpreted as requiring
a showing of probable cause as required by the Fourth Amend-
ment.2°
The panel then turned to the enabling statute:
We could also avoid reaching the Fourth Amendment question
by interpreting 18 U.S.C. Section 3184, which authorizes the is-
suance of arrest warrants pursuant to extradition treaties, as
requiring a traditional showing of probable cause. Unfortu-
nately, like the French treaty, Section 3184 cannot fairly be so
read. Section 3184 allows an arrest warrant to issue on the basis
of a "complaint ... charging [the person to be arrested] with
having committed" an extraditable offense. Once again, all Sec-
tion 3184 requires is a showing that the fugitive has been
charged with committing an extraditable crime. Section 3184
does not require an independent judicial determination of prob-
able cause to believe the fugitive committed the offense.2
The court concluded, therefore, that it was "obligated to reach the
constitutional question that the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits
managed to avoid."'
The panel then rejected the government's argument that provisional
arrests are different from other arrests in that they are for a "limited
purpose" of holding an individual charged with an extraditable crime for
a limited time so that the foreign government can gather and transmit
203.
In keeping with time-honored precepts of judicial restraint, we too could avoid the
constitutional question raised by the government's argument if the treaty with
France, like the treaty with Italy considered in Caltagirone and the treaty with
Spain considered in Sahagian, could fairly be interpreted as requiring a showing
of probable cause in addition to the existence of a foreign arrest warrant.
Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1372-73.
204. Id. at 1373.
205. Id.
206. Id at 1375.
Spring 1998]
Michigan Journal of International Law
the evidence necessary for extradition.' The court found that the gov-
ernment had failed to provide any "cogent reason" why the limited
purpose of a provisional arrest warrant should mean that the Fourth
Amendment can be interpreted to allow for the provisional arrest of Par-
retti without an independent determination of probable cause:
To repeat, the Warrant Clause states, "[N]o Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion".... The clarity of this language allows for no exceptions,
regardless whether the government's purpose in making the ar-
rest is to enforce treaties or our own domestic laws .... When a
person is arrested and detained, he is deprived of his most pre-
cious liberty, freedom from restraint by the government ....
The severity of that deprivation does not vary with the govern-
ment's purpose in making the arrest. Even if it did, the
command of the Warrant Clause is immutable.
The court therefore rejected what it called "the government's invita-
tion to carve out an exception to the probable cause requirement of the
Warrant Clause" for provisional arrests pursuant to treaties.2 ° The court
also rejected the government's "practical" argument that to require it to
make a full showing of probable cause for a provisional arrest warrant
would be to require "the complete extradition showing at the provisional
arrest stage, which would make the later extradition hearing redundant."21'
This argument had "no merit" because the difference between the provi-
sional arrest and the extradition hearing does not lie in the requirement of
probable cause: "The difference lies in the fact that before extraditability
may be certified, the fugitive is entitled to a hearing.., at which he may
introduce evidence and raise certain affirmative defenses."2
The court also rejected the government's contention that a probable
cause requirement for the issuance of a provisional arrest warrant would
create a "practical impossibility" because fugitives would be able to flee
before the requesting government could gather and transmit the evi-
dence required for extradition. First, the court noted that because some
extradition treaties, including the ones discussed in Caltagirone and Sa-
hagian, already require a probable cause showing before provisional




210. Id. at 1376.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1377. In his Ninth Circuit brief, Parretti had argued that the government's
assertion of practical impossibility did not apply in this case because he had notified two
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the panel said that "the hurdles created by the Fourth Amendment in the
path of treaty enforcement are no different from the hurdles created for
our own law enforcement officers.... 211
The court thus rejected the government's argument that a warrant
for provisional arrest may constitutionally be issued on the existence of
a foreign arrest warrant charging the fugitive with having committed
extraditable crimes but unsupported by evidence establishing probable
cause. 21 Instead, the court held that both the extradition treaty with
France and Section 3184 violated the Fourth Amendment to the extent
they purported to allow for the issuance of a provisional arrest warrant
215
without an independent judicial determination of probable cause.
2. Proof of Probable Cause
The court then turned to whether there had been any proof of prob-
able cause justifying the issuance of Parretti's arrest warrant. Parretti
had contended that the arrest warrant was issued on the basis of "no evi-
dence whatsoever. 216 He had argued that the arrest warrant had issued
solely on the basis of the allegations contained in the French arrest war-
rant, and that "allegations are not fact., 217 The panel agreed with him,
finding that the government had failed to make the evidentiary showing
required to obtain a provisional arrest warrant:
In sum, Parretti is correct that the government's probable cause
showing consisted of nothing more than naked allegations. They
may have been relayed to the State Department by a reliable
source, but those allegations without supporting affidavits or
other competent evidence provide no basis for a judicial deter-
mination whether there is probable cause to believe that Parretti
committed an extraditable crime. In essence, the government is
different nations of his travel plans well in advance of coming to the United States, and that
this case did not involve an emergency because the charges had been under investigation
since September, 1991, with the warrant being issued on May 3, 1995. "There is no doubt
that if the French officials who are responsible for translating and preparing the necessary
extradition papers were locked in the Metropolitan Detention Center, and could only be re-
leased after the papers were completed, that paperwork would have been done long ago."
Emergency Motion Under Circuit Rule 27-3 at 14-15, Parretti (CV 95-7593-JMI) (C.D.
Cal.).
213. Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1377:
214. Id. at 1377-78.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1378.
217. "According to the information and belief allegations of the AUSA's Complaint, the
facts alleged in the French arrest warrant were obtained from 'investigations' by unidentified
French authorities and from unidentified experts, shareholders, and employees .... The
government presented no affidavits, deposition testimony or other competent evidence." Id.
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asking us to equate the existence of a foreign arrest warrant with
a showing of probable cause."'
The court rejected the government's claim that it was sufficient to
relay the factual findings of the French magistrate on information and
belief. Without finding that the French magistrate was inherently unreli-
able, the panel embraced Parretti's argument that the complaint was
constitutionally deficient because it failed to indicate the sources of the
information presented. Thus, even if the information in the complaint
might indeed turn out to be reliable, the court was unwilling to make
that leap of faith without some understanding and corroboration of the
source of that information.219 The court rejected as "misplaced" or
"miscite[d]" the government's reliance on Yordi, Russell, and Grin.2
In holding that Parretti's arrest violated the Fourth Amendment be-
cause the government had failed to make the necessary evidentiary
showing of probable cause, the court left unanswered the question of
just how much evidence is enough to establish probable cause to sustain
the issuance of a provisional arrest warrant and in what form that evi-
dence should be presented to the magistrate. The government would
218. Id. at 1379.
219. Id. at 1379-80.
220. In Yordi,
[T]he magistrate had before him ample evidence consisting of the record of the
foreign judicial proceedings that had resulted in the foreign warrant for Yordi's ar-
rest, including the testimony of witnesses .. .. Thus the magistrate was able to
determine 'that the prosecution against the accused was based on real grounds,
and not upon mere suspicion of guilt' .... It is true, as the government says, that
the Yordi Court rejected the argument that an extradition complaint must be sworn
to by persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged. However, the Court
did so in order to acknowledge that evidence used to support probable cause find-
ings could take the form of 'depositions, warrants, or other papers offered in
evidence, ... if they shall be properly and legally authenticated so as to entitle
them to be received as evidence of the criminality of the person so appre-
hended ....'
Id. at 1379 (quoting Yordi v. Nolte, 215 U.S. 227, 229-31 (1909) (quoting in turn Rice v.
Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 375 (1901))).
The panel similarly observed that in Russell the magistrate had before him sworn testi-
mony, and that the statement in Grin that "[a]ll that is required ... is that a complaint shall
be made under oath" was qualified by that Court's explanation that the complaint "may be
made by any person ... having knowledge of the facts, or, in the absence of such person, by
the official representative of the foreign government based upon depositions in his posses-
sion .... .' Id. (quoting Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 193 (1902)).
In citing these cases for the proposition that probable cause was established by the
AUSA's information and belief allegations contained in the French arrest warrant,
the government effectively returns to the theory that lies at the core of its argu-
ment: that the Fourth Amendment allows a warrant for 'provisional arrest' to be
issued for treaty purposes without an evidentiary showing of probable cause.
Id. at 1379-80.
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now have to present more than an underlying warrant from a foreign
government; but the question remained how much of a record would be
enough and upon what sources the government could rely in making
such a record. The court noted only that the government had "presented
no affidavits, deposition testimony, or other competent evidence" that
could have provided Judge Reichmann with a substantial basis for con-
cluding that probable cause existed.2'
3. Due Process and the Presumption against Bail
In addition to his claims based on the Fourth Amendment, Parretti
had argued that his detention without bail prior to his extradition hearing
deprived him of liberty in violation of the Fifth Amendment guarantee
to due process.22' Parretti based his argument on the fact that the district
court denied bail even after refusing to find that he posed a risk of
flight.2  In denying Parretti bail, the district court relied on a finding
that he had failed to demonstrate that there were special circumstances
warranting bail in his case.2
The Ninth Circuit majority concluded that it was not bound by
Wright v. Henkel and its progeny because no court had actually
considered whether due process might foreclose application of the
special circumstances test.21 Yet, as the government pointed out later in
221. Id. at 1378.
222. Id. Under Article IV of the U.S.-France Treaty, a requesting country has forty days
after a provisional arrest warrant is executed to submit a formal request for extradition. As a
result, a person arrested on a provisional arrest warrant may be jailed for forty days, even
without a showing that he is a flight risk. Treaty of Extradition between the United States and
France, supra note 122, art. IV.
223. At Parretti's bail hearing, the district court said "I can't say he's a flight risk .... I
don't see him as a flight risk.' The court nevertheless denied bail and said, "Mr. Parretti,
unfortunately, must remain in custody for the remainder of the 40 days." Emergency Motion
Under Circuit Rule 27-3 at 27, Parretti, (CV 95-7593-JMI) (C.D. Cal.).
224. Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903).
225.
The government, apparently conceding that no court has ever discussed or even
alluded to the due process question, responds that Wright v. Henkel ... and its
progeny have held sub silentio that the "special circumstances" standard is con-
stitutional by repeatedly applying it to deny bail in extradition cases. Specifically,
the government contends that "it cannot be presumed that this court's and the Su-
preme Court's earlier decisions ignored due process concerns in adopting and
applying the 'special circumstances' standard." Pet. For Reh'g at 12. Not surpris-
ingly, the government cites no authority in support of this startling proposition. It
is a time honored principle of stare decisis that "[q]uestions which merely lurk in
the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to
be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents."
Parreni, 112 F.3d at 1381-82 (quoting Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925), and citing
United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952)).
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its Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, in
Wright itself the petitioner had lodged a due process challenge to the
court's denial of bail:
In Wright itself, however, the petitioner claimed that "the denial
of the right to give bail ... constitutes a deprivation of liberty
without due process of law.".... Accordingly, in the very case
that established the special circumstances test, the Court con-
sidered and rejected a due process argument in the context of
bail pending extradition.226
The Parretti court concluded that earlier cases upholding detention
without a showing of flight risk had been based exclusively on the need
to ensure safety of the community:? 7
[B]oth Parretti and the government rely on United States v.
Salerno.... In Salerno, the Supreme Court rejected a due process
challenge to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 ... which authorized pre-
trial detention without bail upon a showing that no release condition
would reasonably assure the safety of the community. After declar-
ing that "[iun our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to
trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception," the Court
held that the safety of the community was a sufficiently "legitimate
and compelling" government interest to justify the "carefully lim-
ited exception" carved out by Congress in the Bail Reform Act of
1984.... Such carefully limited exceptions are permitted only when
the government's interest is "sufficiently weighty" to subordinate
"the individual's strong interest in liberty" to "the greater needs of
society ' 22
The court declined to "carve out another exception to the rule that
'liberty is the norm' in order to deprive extraditees of their personal lib-
erty pending extradition hearings. 2 9
As the government puts it, detention is necessary, to "avoid any
risk that the extraditee may flee [before an extradition hearing]"
.... In other words, the government maintains that its interest
226. Government's Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 7-
8, Parretti (No. 95-56586) (citations omitted).
227. Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1383. The panel observed that a review of detention jurispru-
dence by Salerno "demonstrates that the need to protect the community from danger was the
common thread running through all of the cases permitting the pre-trial detention of persons
who are not found to be flight risks." Id. (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-
49(1987)).
228. Id. (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748-49).
229. Id. at 1382.
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in fulfilling its treaty obligations is so compelling that it justifies
detention pending every extradition hearing regardless of how
negligible the risk of flight. °
While the court acknowledged that the government had important
interests in enforcing extradition treaties, the majority found that those
interests do not justify automatic detention without bail.23 "The problem
with the government's argument is the implicit premise that its interest
in the enforcement of extradition treaties is materially different from
and greater than its interest in the enforcement of our own criminal
laws.... The Government fails to suggest any difference, and we can
fathom none.2 32 The court noted that had Parretti been arrested on do-
mestic fraud charges, absent a showing that he was dangerous or that he
posed a flight risk, "it would be unthinkable that he could be held with-
out bail pending trial."' 3
[T]he government asks us to break new constitutional ground in
holding that Parretti's "strong interest in liberty," Salerno, 481
U.S. at 750 ... may be "subordinated," id., to the government's
interest in avoiding the risk of being unable to carry out its
treaty obligations, however attenuated that risk might be. On
that logic, the government would never have to prove that an
extraditee was a flight risk. All extraditees could be detained
without bail before their extradition hearings regardless of the
magnitude of the risk of flight. Such a far-reaching exception to
the principle that "liberty is the norm" cannot be justified by the
government's asserted interest in taking no risk that it will be
unable to deliver an extraditee if he is found to be extraditable.
Enforcement of our own laws, which, after all, is the govern-
mental interest served by extradition treaties, does not justify
pre-trial detention absent a finding of flight risk or dangerous-
ness, and we see no reason, and the government suggests none,
why its interest in fulfilling its treaty obligations is different
from or any more compelling than its interest in enforcing our
own criminal laws. Just as the government's asserted interest in
230. Id. (quoting Government's Response to Habeas Petition).
231. Parretti himself acknowledged that the government does "have an interest in
making sure it can fulfill its obligation to surrender the person if extradition is determined to
be appropriate under the Treaty." Emergency Motion under Circuit Rule 27-3, at 28, Parretti,
(CV 95-7593-JMI) (C.D. Cal.) (citation omitted). But Parretti argued that this interest can be
protected by "making bail available to persons who do not pose a risk of flight, and denying
bail to those who do." Id.
232. Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1383.
233. Id.
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avoiding all risk that a defendant will not appear for trial is not
sufficient to justify pre-trial detention, the government's asserted
interest in avoiding all risk that an extraditee will not appear for
an extradition hearing cannot justify pre-hearing detention.'
The panel then held that "until such time as an individual is found to
be extraditable, his or her Fifth Amendment liberty interest trumps the
government's treaty interest unless. the government proves to the satis-
faction of the district court that he or she is a flight risk."' Thus, the
panel placed the burden of showing flight risk on the government.
II. SOME POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE RECENT DECISIONS
The government responded to the majority's holding in Parretti with
a petition for rehearing en banc. This petition suggested some of the
potential implications the Parretti decision will have for international
policy and domestic jurisprudence. The government predicted, for ex-
ample, that the Parretti ruling, if allowed to stand, would have
devastating consequences for the conduct of the nation's international
relations:
The resulting "safe harbor" for international fugitives in this
circuit will adversely impact the Secretary of State's ability to
comply with treaty obligations and in turn negotiate the arrest
and surrender by foreign countries of fugitives from U.S.
charges. If even a fraction of foreign fugitives flee, it will sig-
nificantly compromise the enforcement and negotiation of
foreign agreements.'
During the Parretti en banc hearing, the government argued that the
three-judge panel had imposed unprecedented adid unwarranted barriers
to extradition and that these barriers would impede the apprehension of
234. Id. at 1384.
235. Id. One commentator who has advocated abandoning the special circumstances
doctrine in favor of a risk-of-flight test has argued that the burden should nevertheless re-
main with the arrestee, who should be made to demonstrate that he is not a flight risk. See
Hall, supra note 18, at 615-16:
Given that the international extradition process is expressly aimed at persons who
have fled the criminal justice process at least once, it is reasonable to require that
the defendant show that he will not flee again. Practical considerations of proof
also support placing the burden on the accused .... The government ... typically
has far less information about the suspect than it would at a comparable time in a
domestic criminal case. [I]t is likely the defendant will be in a better position to
bring forth information and prove the appropriateness of release on bail.
236. Government's Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 2, Parreui (No. 95-56586).
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fugitives."7 Noting France's recent decision not to extradite convicted
murderer Ira Einhorn to the United States, the government's lawyer im-
plied that a diplomatic quid pro quo is necessary to keep foreign policy
on course and to keep open the flow of fugitives arrested abroad and
wanted on criminal charges here. "8
In the government's view, the Due Process Clause does not compel
the Ninth Circuit's ruling because the presumption against bail is justi-
fied by the common sense notion that a person who has refused
voluntarily to submit to a foreign government's judicial system poses a
risk of flight. The presumption is also justified by the government's
heightened interest in avoiding flight by foreign fugitives:
Flight not only renders the government unable to comply with
its treaty obligation in the case at issue, but may also have wide-
ranging effects on foreign relations by impacting the govern-
ment's ability to convince foreign governments that it is worth
their while to enter into agreements with the U.S.'"
The government further argued "that the 'special circumstances' test
for granting bail adequately addresses those situations in which an ex-
traditee's liberty interest so outweighs the government's interest that
continued detention is not warranted."' 4°
237. Lis Wiehl, Extradition Case Could Force the U.S. to Renegotiate Many Treaties,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 22, 1997, at All. U.S. Attorney Nora M. Manella, who argued the case for
the government, responding to Judge Stephen Reinhardt's question: "How can the govern-
ment justify throwing someone in jail without any showing of any kind?" Audiotape of the
argument before the en banc panel, Parretti, Dec. 18, 1997 (audiotape on file with author).
238. Audiotape of the argument before the en banc panel, Parretti, Dec. 18, 1997
(audiotape on file with author).
239. Government's Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 2,
Parretti (No. 95-56586). Judge Reinhardt recognized this point in his concurring opinion in
Parretti, when he took issue with Judge Norris' view that the government's interest in up-
holding its treaty obligations in extraditions is really nothing more than a desire to secure
reciprocal help from other countries in aid of domestic law enforcement.
I disagree that the government's interests in fulfilling its treaty obligations stems
solely from its interest in domestic law enforcement .... The failure of a country
to deliver on its promises can have many unpredictable consequences quite apart.
from the effects on its ability to secure the assistance of others when it is the one
that desires to obtain or exercise the right to extradite. It is important to the na-
tion's overall ability to work effectively in the international arena that it be thought
of as a country that keeps its commitments.
Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1390.
240. Government's Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 3,
Parretti (No. 95-56586). The government pointed out that the court essentially applied to
extradition proceedings the standards of the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (1994).
Courts have held, however, that the Act is inapplicable in the extradition context. See, e.g.,
Kamrin v. United States, 725 F.2d 1225, 1227-29 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Heilbronn, 773 F.
Supp. 1576, 1578 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
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In addressing the Fourth Amendment issue, the government was
adamant about the far-reaching implications of the Parretti decision:
"[The requirement of a traditional probable cause showing is at odds
with the limited purpose of provisional arrests, denies appropriate defer-
ence to the foreign charging document, and intrudes on the Secretary of
State's exclusive discretion to inquire into the nature of foreign criminal
processes."" The government acknowledged that the Fourth Amend-
ment is implicated by a provisional arrest but maintained that the
probable cause inquiry should focus on the reason for that arrest, asking
only whether there is a sufficient basis to initiate an extradition hearing
with a showing of probable cause to believe that the extraditee is named
in a validly issued foreign warrant charging extraditable crimes.24
By requiring an evidentiary showing for a foreign judicial official's
recitation of allegations and facts, the government argued, Parretti will
unnecessarily diminish the government's ability to use provisional arrest
warrants:
Extradition treaties authorize provisional arrest as a means of
allowing temporary detention while the foreign country pre-
pares an extradition packet containing the very evidentiary
support that the panel now requires to justify provisional arrest.
Eliminating the ability to arrest on less than a full evidentiary
showing effectively ensures that some fugitives discovered in
the U.S. will be able to flee before the foreign country can as-
semble, translate, and transmit evidence needed to satisfy the
requisite showing. 24
In the Parretti case, for example, the evidence offered at the extra-
dition hearing included volumes of documents, most of which had been
translated from French into English.2" According to the government,
requiring the same evidentiary showing of probable cause at the provi-
sional arrest stage as at the extradition hearing itself would result in a
"practical impossibility" in many cases, including Parretti's.24
241. Government's Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 3,
Parretti (No. 95-56586).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 17.
244. Id. at 18. In a telephone interview, George Cardona, the AUSA who handled the
Parretti extradition case, said: "There was a huge practical problem in getting all of the
documents translated. We had documents from Luxembourg, Germany, Spain, Italy, Finland,
and France, all of which had to first be translated into French, and then into English." Tele-
phone Interview with George Cardona, AUSA (July 1, 1997).
245.
According to the panel, the evidentiary showing at the provisional arrest stage and
at the extradition hearing must be the same; it is only the fact that an extraditee
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Apart from the potential consequences predicted by the government
in Parretti, the recent decisions questioning the constitutionality of pro-
visional arrests and denial of bail have raised and left unanswered many
questions which have already begun to plague federal prosecutors and
officials at the Department of Justice.4 Some of these consequences
became clear in the first extradition matters to be heard after the publi-
cation of Parretti. For example, in one extradition case in which the
fugitive was arrested pre-Parretti on a provisional warrant application
extremely similar to Parretti's, the government suddenly found itself
post-Parretti facing a number of Parretti-based motions, including a
motion for the fugitive's immediate release. 7 As in Parretti, the Gov-
ernment had not submitted foreign affidavits or deposition testimony in
support of the Complaint. The court was able to deny the motion and
refrain from ruling on the legality of the arrest because in the interim
since the fugitive's provisional arrest the requesting country (Austria)
had transmitted the full extradition package, including deposition testi-
mony and documentation of probable cause, and the government had
filed an "amended complaint," obtained a second warrant, and re-
arrested the accused in compliance with the requirements of Parretti.2
In yet another case, which began after Parretti was decided, the Gov-
ernment delayed its application for a provisional warrant for several
weeks in order to gather and translate enough documentation to support
a finding of probable cause249 The arrest was ultimately accomplished
because the fugitive stayed put during the time the government was as-
sembling the documentation. However, had he been in motion, or had he
can present defenses at the extradition hearing that makes the two procedures dif-
ferent. Accordingly, it could indeed have been a 'practical impossibility' to gather
the evidence necessary under the panel's holding to arrest Parretti while he re-
mained in the U.S.
Government's Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 18, Parretti
(No. 95-56586).
246. The author has conducted extensive telephone interviews with federal prosecutors
involved in the Parretti case and appeal, and with various authorities from the OIA. Pursuant
to Department of Justice policy, most of these prosecutors and officials asked not to be
named in this article.
247. In re Extradition of Michael Peter Spitzauer (No. 97-009M-01) (W.D.Wash. 1997).
248. In Spitzauer, the effect of Parretti was equally dramatic in terms of the bail ques-
tion. Whereas before Parretti Mr. Spitzauer's counsel had not even contested his detention,
after the decision Spitzauer moved for a bail hearing. The hearing lasted through two days of
testimony on whether Mr. Spitzauer was a flight risk before the court finally reordered him
detained. Id.
249. In re the Extradition of Kenneth Lynden Smithson, No. (97-M-5085) (W.D. Wash.
1997).
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learned of the extradition request, the government would not have been
able to stop him from fleeing. °
Even before Parretti, the government responded to the Second Cir-
cuit's decision in Caltagirone by amending its extradition treaty with
Italy to remove the "further information" requirement for arrest. The
amended treaty "removes the impediment to provisional arrest under the
present treaty ... and brings the provisional arrest article into accord
with those in the great majority of our treaties."'
The government's response to Caltagirone has been to amend extra-
dition treaties to remove the "further information" language whenever
the opportunity has arisen. According to the OIA, only our extradition
treaties with the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Israel, Japan, and
Spain now contain provisions for "further information." ' This language
was removed because the government believed that Caltagirone was
wrongly decided, and the government did not want the door to be open
to the claim that the government must demand such "further informa-
tion" as to probable cause before provisional arrests can be made. 2
The implications of this trend toward according greater constitu-
tional protections to fugitives fighting extradition from the United States
are dramatic: according to the OIA, the government now has more than
ninety international extradition treaties which do not contain the
"further information" or probable cause language.2 The judicial trend
toward requiring probable cause for provisional arrests may inevitably
necessitate amendment of those treaties to include such language.
250. Interview with Kurt Hermanns, AUSA for the Western District of Washington,
Oct. 1, 1997, in Seattle, Washington.
251. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Extradition Treaty with Italy, S. Exec. Rep.
33, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprinted in I EXTRADITION LAWS AND TREATIES: UNITED
STATES 450.16 (1.1. Kavass & A. Sprudz, Comps. 1979, 1987).
252. Telephone Interview with John E. Harris, Deputy Director of the OIA, U.S. De-
partment of Justice, August 18, 1997.
253.
The Italian treaty negotiated in 1973 contained the 'further information' language,
but that language was removed during the 1983 treaty negotiations with Italy. The
language was removed precisely because the government did not want to appear to
agree with the proposition that probable cause is required for provisional arrest.
The government thought that Caltagirone was wrongly decided, so we did not
want to make it look like we thought there was a constitutional right to probable
cause for provisional arrests.
254. Id.
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IV. EXTRADITION LAW AT THE CROSSROADS: A SUGGESTED APPROACH
To EVALUATING THE TREND TOWARD EXTENDING GREATER
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS TO FUGITIVES
FIGHTING EXTRADITION FROM THE UNITED STATES
If Parretti and its predecessors communicate a single message, it is
that U.S. law concerning arrest and detention in extradition is at a cross-
roads. Behind us lie more than a hundred years of caselaw and some
ancient shibboleths which have justified denying extradition arrestees
some important procedural safeguards that are given to defendants in
domestic criminal cases. What lies ahead will depend on whether those
shibboleths or assumptions stand up to renewed scrutiny. To the extent
that they do not stand up, the recent trend is likely to continue, and ex-
tradition fugitives are likely to win even more constitutional procedural
protection. If the old justifications for treating extraditions as a world
apart are still valid, however, or if new ones can be found, the constitu-
tional 'movement' in extradition law may not be able to travel much
further.
Guidance and leadership from the Supreme Court are overdue. The
Court has not addressed the bail issue in extradition since Wright v.
Henkel in 1903, and has not heard a case addressing the standards for
the issuance of provisional warrants in nearly as long. Certainly after
Parretti-and arguably after Caltagirone, Russell, Sahagian, and Wil-
liams-the circuits have been split on the issue of the government's
probable cause burden in support of a provisional arrest warrant. On the
bail issue, the cases applying the special circumstances doctrine have
been consistent only in their inconsistency, even before Parretti threw
out the doctrine entirely. In reviewing Parretti the Court could address
both issues.
If and when it takes up these questions, the Court-or any other
court called upon to do so-should examine closely not only the old
assumptions for treating extraditions differently, but also several key
assumptions on which the three-judge panel in Parretti relied.
The first such assumption is that the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment cannot and does not allow for a varying standard of prob-
able cause depending on the interests at stake. As the Parretti court
stated:
To repeat, the Warrant Clause states, "[N]o Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation" .
... The clarity of this language allows for no exceptions, re-
gardless of whether the government's purpose in making the
arrest is to enforce treaties or our own domestic laws ... [T]he
Spring 19981
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command of the Warrant Clause that no warrant issue but upon
probable cause is immutable.25
Whatever the appeal of this view, it is not borne out by practice or
history. Warrants have been permitted to issue upon varying showings,
for varying purposes. The government has been able to obtain adminis-
trative search warrants on showings not of "probable cause," but merely
of "reasonable belief or suspicion."'' The government did not bring this
to the court's attention in Parretti. Moreover, federal law has long per-
mitted the arrest and detention of certain persons who are not even
charged with committing crimes-specifically, material witnesses-in
order to assure that they will be present to testify in criminal trials. 7
While a warrant for the arrest of a material witness, like a criminal ar-
rest warrant, must be based upon a showing of probable cause, the party
seeking the warrant has only been required to show two simple things:
the testimony of the witness is material, and it may become impractica-
ble to secure his presence by subpoena.5' This is really just a way of
255. Parretti v. United States, 112 F3d 1363, 1375 (9th Cir. 1997).
256. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1978); see Michigan v. Clifford,
464 U.S. 287, 294-95 (1984) (administrative warrant may issue on showing that fire was of
undetermined origin, search would not impinge on victim's privacy, and search would be
executed at reasonable and convenient time); Martin v. International Matex Tank Terminals-
Bayonne, 928 F.2d 614, 623-25 (3d Cir. 1991) (administrative search warrant may issue on
showing of reasonable belief or suspicion that OSHA violated); In re Kelly-Springfield Tire
Co., 13 F.3d 1160, 1166 (7th Cir. 1994); International Molders' and Allied Workers' Local
Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 799 F.2d 547, 553 (9th Cir. 1986) (administrative search warrant
may issue on showing of reasonable likelihood that establishment contained illegal aliens;
specific description of every suspected alien not required); Tri-State Steel Constr., Inc. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 26 F.3d 173, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(administrative search warrant may issue on showing of specific evidence of existing OSHA
violation).
257. In relevant part, the material witness statute provides:
If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is
material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracti-
cable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer may
order the arrest of the person and treat the person in accordance with the provi-
sions of [the Bail Reform Act].
18 U.S.C. § 3144 (1994).
258. See, e.g., United States v. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. 1541 (D.Col. 1996); Aguilar-
Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F2d 411 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Nai Fook Li, 949 F Supp. 42
(D.Mass. 1996); United States v. Huang, 827 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); United States v.
Coldwell, 469 F. Supp. 305, 307 (E.D. Okl. 1979); United States v. Feingold, 416 F Supp.
627 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
In addition to material witness warrants, it is interesting to compare provisional arrest
warrants with another kind of arrest warrant which federal courts issue routinely to capture
fugitives from state prosecution, under the statute penalizing "Unlawful Flight to Avoid
Prosecution" (or "UFAP"), 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1994). That statute provides in relevant part:
"Whoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign commerce with intent ... to avoid prose-
cution ... under the laws of the place from which he flees ... [for] a felony ... shall be
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saying that his presence is necessary for a judicial proceeding, and it
cannot be secured in any other way. The same can be said of a provi-
sional arrest warrant-that the fugitive is someone whose presence is
necessary for a judicial proceeding, and that his provisional arrest is the
only way to secure his presence until an evidentiary showing of prob-
able cause can be made. In Parretti, the Government did not make this
comparison.
While an obvious difference is that a material witness will not ordi-
narily face charges after his arrest, this does not alter the fact that the
two standards both require findings of "probable cause," but probable
cause to believe that very different sorts of events have occurred. One
standard requires a showing that a crime has been committed and that
the defendant committed it. The other requires a showing that a witness'
testimony is material and unobtainable unless he is arrested. Why, then,
can the Fourth Amendment not allow a warrant to issue on a showing of
probable cause to believe that yet a third kind of event has occurred,
namely, that a fugitive is charged abroad with an extraditable crime?
The answer depends on whether the government's interests are of a suf-
ficient magnitude to justify arrest.2 9
The second untested assumption of the Parretti panel is that the
governmental interests at stake in extraditions are no greater than the
interests at stake when the government seeks to arrest and detain crimi-
nals in domestic cases. As the Parretti panel stated it:
Enforcement of our own laws, which, after all, is the govern-
mental interest served by extradition treaties, does not justify
fined ... or imprisoned not more than five years, or both' In their affidavits in support of
UFAP complaints, federal agents are not required to set forth the grounds for probable cause
regarding the crime from which the fugitive is fleeing, nor do the federal courts look behind
the face of the state charging documents to see if there was a sufficient evidentiary showing
of probable cause. Roynica v. State, 309 F. 2d 475, 479 (Ala.Crim.App. 1974); Common-
wealth v. Lewis, 398 A.2d 1016, 1018 (Pa. 1979); Bowers v. Coiner, 309 F. Supp. 1064,
1068-69 (S.D.W. Va. 1970); State v. Ford, 495 S.W.2d. 408, 413 (Mo. 1973). When seeking
a UFAP warrant, the government is required to show probable cause to believe only that the
fugitive is fleeing to avoid prosecution. Such a limited showing would presumably pass
muster under the Fourth Amendment because, since it is the act of flight that has been crimi-
nalized, probable cause as to flight is all that need be shown. If Parretti becomes the law of
the land, the government may wish to include 'flight to avoid prosecution' as an extraditable
offense in new or revised extradition treaties, so that provisional warrants can be obtained on
as minimal a showing as can be made in obtaining UFAP warrants.
259. See Government's Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc
at 14, Parretti (No. 95-56586) (9th Cir. filed June 19, 1997). The government asserted that a
varying standard of probable cause "assures the protection against unreasonable seizures
intended by the Fourth Amendment, by ensuring that the seizure is reasonably related to a
valid purpose-temporary detention on an extraditable offense to enable the initiation of
formal extradition proceedings:' Id.
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pre-trial detention absent a finding of flight risk or dangerous-
ness, and we see no reason, and the government suggests none,
why its interest in fulfilling its treaty obligations is different
from or any more compelling than its interests in enforcing our
own criminal laws.mo
This assumption, too, is subject to challenge. The federal govern-
ment's interests in international comity and mutual treaty compliance
are arguably greater than its interests in purely domestic law enforce-
ment. These heightened interests might justify a denial of some
procedural protections to international fugitives in extraditions in a way
that could not be similarly justified in a domestic criminal matter. The
case can certainly be made that in extradition cases the government has
interests that extend well beyond mere reciprocity. These interests in-
clude peace and commerce with other nations. In Parretti, the
government could have explored at much greater length the various
ways in which its interests in treaty compliance might sometimes sur-
pass its interests in domestic law enforcement. It did not. A reviewing
court should do so.
Third, in its holding on the bail issue, the Parretti court assumed
that it was not bound by the Supreme Court's ruling in Wright v. Henkel
because no court had actually considered whether due process might
foreclose the denial of bail to an arrestee who did not pose a risk of
flight or a danger to the community." On this point the panel's assump-
tion may not be correct. In Wright itself the petitioner claimed that "the
denial of the right to give bail.., constitutes a deprivation of liberty
without due process of law."2"' In the very case that established the spe-
cial circumstances test, the Court considered and rejected a due process
argument in the context of bail pending extradition.
Moreover, the panel appears to have clearly erred in asserting that
"the only governmental interest that has ever been deemed sufficiently
weighty to justify pre-trial or pre-hearing detention without bail absent a
finding of flight risk is the safety of the community."263 As has just been
mentioned, federal courts routinely order the detention of material wit-
260. Parretti v. United States, 112 F.3d 1363, 1384 (9th Cir. 1997). In his concurring
opinion, Judge Reinhardt described the government's interest somewhat differently:
The government frequently has a significant interest in seeing that criminals who
have fled to, or happen to be in, this country are punished for their foreign
crimes-if only because those crimes may have a substantial effect, direct or indi-
rect, on American interests both at home and abroad.
Id. at 1390.
261. Id. at 1382.
262. Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 43 (1903).
263. Parretti, 112 F3d at 1383.
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nesses in criminal prosecutions-persons who are not even charged with
crimes-for no other reason than the impracticability of securing the
testimony of these witnesses by subpoena. Pre-trial detention has also
been ordered for defendants who have engaged in obstruction of justice,
or who, it is feared, will otherwise tamper with a witness or with evi-
dence. Some of these situations may implicate the safety of the
community, but not all of them do. The government did not alert the
Parretti court to either of these justifications. Again, however, a re-
viewing court should consider them.
Furthermore, even if one is inclined to abandon the special circum-
stances test and replace it with a risk-of-flight analysis, one should not
necessarily assume, as the three-judge panel in Parretti appears to have
done, that the presumption against bail should also be abandoned, and
that the burden of proof should fall upon the government. Acting on this
assumption may be a proverbial example of throwing out the baby with
the bathwater. The special circumstances doctrine and the presumption
against bail are two very different things and are not inexorably inter-
twined. It is possible to dispense with the former while preserving the
latter. The case can certainly be made that a rebuttable presumption
against bail in an extradition case-in which, after all, the fugitive has
presumptively fled already once-may be as fitting as other presump-
tions against bail that are already codified in our domestic laws. One
example is the rebuttable presumption in the Bail Reform Act that certain
defendants in drug cases punishable by ten or more years in prison should
be detained.25 To rebut the presumption, the fugitive would be permitted
to satisfy the court, as Mr. Parretti did, that he is not a flight risk.2"
One particularly troubling aspect of the Parretti paneFs ruling is its
lack of deference to the executive branch in the foreign affairs arena.
Courts have traditionally shown considerable deference to the State De-
partment in extradition cases, even when deciding justiciable questions
that are fully within the purview of the courts."' The fact that a question
is a justiciable one-such as the "paradigmatic justiciable question"''
whether a warrant application is supported by probable cause--does not
264. See Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15 (1967); United States v. Gamble, 295 F.
Supp. 1192 (D. Tex. 1969); Fernandez v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 642 (1961); United States v.
Graewe, 689 F2d 54 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Cozzetti, 441 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Gilbert, 425 F2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
265. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1994).
266. For the view that the burden of disproving risk of flight should rest with the fugi-
tive, see Hall, supra note 16, at 615-16. See also Mary Coombs, Case Note, 92 AM. J. INT'L
L. 91, 94 (1998).
267. For a comprehensive discussion of this tradition of deference, see HENIN, supra
note 181; KOH, supra note 181; FRANCK, supra note 181.
268. Parretti, 112 F3d at 1369.
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mean that the court in its treatment of that question should show no def-
erence to the executive branch. Even where, as in Parretti, the doctrine
of judicial non-inquiry is held not to apply because the question at issue
is a justiciable one, some deference to the executive branch may never-
theless be appropriate because foreign affairs are implicated. One
example of this in the extradition context is the question whether a valid
extradition treaty is in force between the United States and its treaty
partner at the time of an extradition request. This question is a
"paradigmatically justiciable" question, yet the courts have traditionally
shown great deference to the views of the Secretary of State when con-
fronted with it.69
In Parretti, the court seems to have assumed that deference to the
executive branch should be shown only if the question is a non-
justiciable one barred from judicial consideration by the rule of non-
inquiry. That rule, however, is not the only form that judicial deference
can take. Just as the courts have shown great deference to the execu-
tive's views when deciding whether a valid extradition treaty is in force,
the Parretti panel could have shown similar deference to the executive's
determination that France's charging procedures comported with the
Fourth Amendment's probable cause standard. That executive determi-
nation was not made lightly. Each year, counsel for the State
Department and the Department of Justice carefully screen and review
hundreds of extradition requests and reject many of them for failure to
satisfy U.S. charging standards. 270 Such deference need not be conclu-
sive. However, the State Department's voucher for the reliability of the
foreign charging procedures is a factor that should be given at least
some weight in a court's decision whether to issue a provisional warrant
upon an application sworn to by a government attorney.
One might also ask why the courts should be unwilling to accept the
government's assurances of the reliability of a foreign government's
charging procedures and yet be willing every day to sign arrest warrants
in domestic cases in which probable cause is established largely by the
government's assurances of the reliability of information provided by
269. See, e.g., Sayne v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1969) (advice by State Depart-
ment as to whether extradition treaty is in effect is entitled to great weight and importance);
Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1954) (on the question whether an extradition
treaty has been terminated or is still in effect, the views of the political department of the
government, if not conclusive, are at least of great weight and importance); In re Ryan, 360
F. Supp. 270 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (based on certification by the Secretary of State that extradi-
tion treaty was in effect, claim of detainee that the treaty was not in effect was denied);
Galanis v. Pallanck, 568 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1977).
270. Telephone Interview with Frances Fragos Townsend, Director, OIA U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice (Aug. 15, 1997); Telephone Interview with Sarah Criscitelli, OIA U.S.
Department of Justice (July 30, 1997).
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unnamed confidential informants who are often criminals themselves. In
both instances the government offers assurances of reliability. Some-
thing appears to be awry when courts reject government assurances of
the reliability of accusations made by treaty partners but routinely ac-
cept assurances of the reliability of accusations made by drug dealers
and other informants.
Another troubling aspect of the Parretti decision is the panel's ap-
parent lack of concern for the potential practical consequences of the
ruling. International fugitives are frequently on the move when their
whereabouts are pinpointed. They are often in transit, subject to a nar-
row window in which they can be seized. The difference between
making an arrest and losing the trail can be a matter of days or even
hours. Meanwhile, the often voluminous evidentiary records upon which
foreign charges are based must be assembled, translated, and transmit-
ted through the diplomatic channel. By the time these foreign
documents arrive, a fugitive's trail may have grown cold. If the govern-
ment is forced to wait to obtain an arrest warrant, any warrant that it
subsequently obtains may be useless.
It would be an ironic and unintended consequence of the Parretti
ruling if the government now found it necessary to resort to pretext ar-
rests of international fugitives on domestic charges simply to buy time
until extradition warrants could be obtained in compliance with Parretti.
It is not difficult to imagine government agents, for example, desper-
ately searching for any grounds available on which to arrest such
fugitives simply to hold them on domestic charges long enough to per-
mit foreign records to arrive through the diplomatic channel. Some of
these arrests might be legitimate, given the possibility that international
fugitives who have entered the United States may have violated immi-
gration or customs laws, passport control laws, or currency reporting
requirements in the process."7' When legitimate domestic charges cannot
271. Because international fugitives are likely to enter the United States furtively or at
least with awareness that they are wanted elsewhere, and because they may be carrying with
them the proceeds or evidence of" crimes committed abroad, they become obvious targets for
investigation of a variety of possible violations of federal law-violations for which they
may reasonably come under suspicion simply by virtue of their transit through U.S. ports of
entry. Entrants can be investigated, for example, for making any materially false statement in
any immigration-related document or for using an alias with the purpose of evading immi-
gration laws. 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1015, 1546 (1994). International fugitives found in this country
may also have committed passport fraud or made false statements in passport applications.
18 U.S.C. Secs. 1542-1544 (1994). They are also open to investigation more generally for
fraud in connection with any false identification documents they may be carrying 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 1028 (1994) and for any materially false statement made to a government agency. 18
U.S.C. Sec. 1001 (1994). Fugitives traveling with large sums of money may be investigated
for possible customs violations or for currency reporting offenses if they fail to disclose
sums greater than $10,000. 31 U.S.C. Sec. 5316 (1994). They can also be investigated for
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be brought, however, there may arise the temptation to manufacture
charges by setting up confrontations between federal agents and fugi-
tives--confrontations during which the chances are high that fugitives
will violate the law. For example, a fugitive who "resists, opposes, im-
pedes, intimidates, or interferes" with a federal law enforcement officer
engaged in the performance of his official duties can be charged with a
felony."' It is not difficult to imagine federal agents making contact with
a fugitive, notifying him that he is wanted abroad, and requesting an
interview about his activities in the United States. One can also imagine
that the fugitive might run, lie, obfuscate, or become evasive, argumen-
tative, or belligerent. The agents could freely interpret his response as
resistance or opposition.
It would be equally ironic if, as a result of the rationale applied in
Parretti, foreign law enforcement officers felt justified in resorting to
"self-help" remedies-for instance, illegally abducting and repatriating
fugitives found in the United States. This possibility is not far-fetched.
U.S. agents resorted to exactly such a gambit when they spirited out of
Mexico a Mexican national accused in the murder of a federal Drug En-
forcement Administration agent.2 7' Still another unintended consequence
of the ruling may be an increasing willingness on the part of the gov-
ernment to deport or expel fugitives under the immigration laws,
thereby bypassing the extradition laws altogether. Many fugitives found
in the United States already have criminal records abroad. A record for
conviction of a serious prior offense abroad makes a foreign fugitive
found in the United States deportable, with limited avenues of appeal. 74
None of these potential consequences bodes well for the continued
viability of the extradition process. If the recent trend toward extending
greater procedural safeguards to extradition arrests leads to unintended
consequences such as these, proponents of this trend should perhaps be
careful what they wish for. If the end result is that extradition arrests
become too difficult to accomplish, we are likely to see more attempts
to circumvent the extradition process entirely-to pull an "end run"
around it whenever possible. The victories won by those who would
wish the extradition process to incorporate more of the procedural safe-
guards accorded to domestic criminal defendants may be pyrrhic.275
transporting in interstate or foreign commerce any stolen or fraudulently obtained property.
18 U.S.C. Sec. 2314 (1994).
272. 18 U.S.C. § 111.
273. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
274. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227 (1994). See also The Illegal Immigration Reform & Im-
migration Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
275. At least one commentator has suggested that the extradition process be trans-
formed into a "mini-trial":
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Ultimately, the key assumptions relied upon by the panel in Parretti
do not appear to withstand close inspection. First, the government's in-
terests in its relations with its extradition treaty partners extend well
beyond securing reciprocal arrests of U.S. fugitives found abroad and
enforcing domestic law. When the United States' treaty relations are
strained, its foreign relations are strained. The quality of these relations
affects not only domestic law enforcement but also international com-
merce. Most importantly, the United States' compliance with its
extradition treaties bears directly on the reliability of the United States
as a treaty partner in other areas as well, including international security
treaties.
The government's interests in its international treaty relations and
its stewardship of foreign affairs generally justify considerable defer-
ence from the courts to the government's needs and its views in
extradition matters-certainly more deference than was shown by the
Ninth Circuit in Parretti. Such deference could allow for a provisional
arrest warrant in an extradition case to issue on a standard of probable
cause that varies from the standard required for the issuance of a do-
mestic criminal warrant.
Finally, the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment may be com-
patible with a varying definition of probable cause that depends on the
purpose' of the warrant sought. To insist that probable cause can mean
only probable cause to believe that the fugitive committed the crime
charged makes no sense, when courts routinely issue warrants for the
arrest of people not even charged with committing crimes-material
witness warrants, for example. For the purpose of obtaining provisional
arrest warrants in extradition cases, probable cause may consequently be
defined as "probable cause to believe that the fugitive is duly charged
abroad with an extraditable offense." Even if one were to insist that a
provisional arrest warrant could not issue without a finding that the fu-
gitive committed the crime abroad, the courts could nonetheless give
considerable deference to the executive branch's sworn assurances of
the proven reliability of the requesting State's charging procedures. This
deference is justified by the interests at stake and the exigencies in-
It would be more forthright and dependable for Congress to enact a statute to pro-
vide for something closer to a mini-trial of the accused in the United States to test
whether the accusations and evidence adequately approach United States stan-
dards, and also to consider whether the accused may really have an unanswerable
defense."
Kester, supra note 3, at 1447.
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volved in arresting international fugitives before they can flee from the
United States."76
That being said, the extradition statute and the various extradition
treaties to which the United States is a party may still be unconstitu-
tional to the extent that they allow so much time to pass after the
fugitive's arrest-in some instances up to ninety days-before the
"evidence of criminality may be heard."2 In an era of rapid electronic
communications and instant transmission of documents by facsimile,
due process may require the "evidence of criminality" to be transmitted
much more quickly than the treaties and the statute allow. While a
ninety-day period might have made sense in the days of the clipper ship
or the steamer, today it seems an anachronism. In domestic cases, the
federal courts have fashioned post-arrest deadlines by which the gov-
ernment must present evidence of probable cause to a magistrate, even
when the magistrate has already seen such evidence in the complaint."'
In extradition cases, similar rules could be applied by the courts, or per-
haps devised by Congress, requiring the requesting State to furnish
276. The author recognizes that there are times when the government can and should be
able to compile the paperwork necessary to establish probable cause that the fugitive com-
mitted the crime charged and that as a policy matter the government should strive to compile
such paperwork where feasible, thereby lessening the need for provisional arrest warrants. If,
for example, the government agents involved in tracking a particular fugitive are confident
that the fugitive, once discovered, will not flee, then the OIA should demand no less from the
foreign government than it demands from our prosecutors who seek to secure the extradition
of fugitives found abroad. As a policy matter, the government should expect no less from our
extradition partners than it does from its own prosecutors. Perhaps the best illustration of this
point comes from Attorney General Janet Reno, who has praised the efforts of U.S. prose-
cutors who make just such a showing before seeking the arrests abroad of fugitives wanted in
the United States. U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno, International Extradition, Memoran-
dum to All United States Attorneys, Oct. 16, 1997.
I have been particularly gratified to learn that, when necessary, you are willing to 'go the
extra mile' by preparing extradition documents which include more than the bare minimum
called for in the applicable treaty, and which are crafted to meet the special evidentiary or
authentication requirements contained in the domestic laws of our treaty partners. Moreover,
when necessary in provisional arrest cases, you are prepared to draft, translate, and submit
these documents to the OIA well before the treaty deadline.
Id.
277. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994).
278. See 18 U.S.C. § 3060 (1994), which requires that even after an arrest on a warrant,
"a preliminary examination shall be held ... to determine whether there is probable cause to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the arrested person has committed it."
The statute requires that the hearing "shall be held within a reasonable time following initial
appearance," meaning within ten days if the defendant is in custody and twenty days if he is
free on bond pending trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3060 (1994). In a similar vein, the Supreme Court
has fashioned the so-called "forty-eight hour rule" for warrantless arrests, requiring the gov-
ernment to present evidence establishing probable cause to a magistrate no later than forty-
eight hours after a warrantless arrest. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44,
57(1991).
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evidence of criminality as rapidly as possible, even before the applicable
treaty allows for the final extradition package to be transmitted. Even in
the present era, the assembly and transmission of the formal extradition
package can take weeks, largely because of the time required for trans-
lation and the subsequent transmission of the documents from the
foreign prosecutor or investigating magistrate to the foreign ministry of
justice, which must then transmit them to the U.S. ambassador for certi-
fication and apostilles. The U.S. ambassador must then forward the
documents to the foreign ministry in the requesting country for trans-
mission to the U.S. State Department, which must then transmit them to
the Department of Justice, which checks them carefully before finally
sending them to the U.S. Attorney in the district of arrest.
One could fashion a rule that a less formal interim package be
transmitted earlier than the formal extradition package, directly from the
foreign ministry of justice to the Department of Justice, even if it meant
that the informal package lacked the apostilles and ambassadorial certi-
fications required for the final package. Such an informal transmission
could suffice for the purpose of satisfying the magistrate within a rea-
sonable time of the arrest that the formal documents expected at the
subsequent formal extradition hearing would establish probable cause to
believe that the arrestee committed the offenses charged abroad. 29 For-
malistically, an interim package would suffice for such a limited
purpose as long as it comported with the requirements of a domestic
complaint and warrant application: a sworn statement by a trained law
enforcement officer or investigator, setting forth facts gathered firsthand
by that officer or learned from the reports of other officers or investiga-
tors, establishing the elements of the offense charged and satisfying the
court of the reliability of any witnesses or confidential informants
whose statements have been relied upon.
279. How much time would be reasonable? The answer might differ in each case, de-
pending on such variables as the complexity of the foreign charges, the need for translation,
the number of documents involved, and the idiosyncrasies of the foreign authorities. In com-
plex cases involving multiple charges, the magistrate might reasonably insist upon an
expedited transmittal of documentation relating to a single charge in order to satisfy the court
quickly that the provisional arrest and detention are justified. Rather than adopt a single
bright-line deadline, the better approach might be to permit the court to inquire of the gov-
ernment how quickly an interim package could be transmitted, based on the variables of the
particular case. The court could make this inquiry at the time the provisional warrant appli-
cation is presented or at the arrestee's initial appearance in court after the arrest.
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EPILOGUE
As of this writing, Giancarlo Parretti is believed to be living in Italy,
in the olive-growing region near Orvieto, where he was raised. His law-
yers say they hear from him only occasionally, and only by facsimile.
